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DYNAMIC ENERGY FEDERALISM 
HARI M. OSOFSKY & HANNAH J. WISEMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
 United States energy law and the scholarship analyzing it are 
deeply fragmented.  Each source of energy has a distinct legal regime, 
and limited federal regulation in some areas has resulted in diver-
gent state and local approaches to regulation.  Much of the existing 
energy law literature reflects these substantive and structural divi-
sions, and focuses on particular aspects of the energy system and as-
sociated federalism disputes.  However, in order to meet modern en-
ergy challenges—such as reducing risks from deepwater drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing, maintaining the reliability of the electricity 
grid in this period of rapid technological change, and producing 
cleaner energy—we need a more dynamic, holistic understanding of 
energy law.  Examining the energy system as a whole reveals patterns 
across substantive areas and allows these areas to learn from one 
another. 
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 This Article provides the first systematic account of energy federal-
ism, proposing a novel model for understanding the energy system 
and its federalism dynamics.  It begins by describing the U.S. energy 
system as comprised of interacting physical, market, and regulatory 
dimensions.  The Article next explains why this complex system re-
quires a federalism model that moves beyond disputes over federal 
versus state authority; it describes the many vertical interactions 
(those across levels of government, from the local to the internation-
al) and horizontal interactions (those among actors within the same 
level of government) within different types of energy regulation.  The 
Article then considers the governance challenges created by these in-
teractions, with a focus on inadequate regulatory authority, simul-
taneous overlap and fragmentation of regulation and institutions, 
and the difficulties of including key public and private stakeholders 
while avoiding inappropriate regulatory capture, such as when pow-
erful utilities or oil companies gain control of regulatory processes to 
protect their private interests at the expense of the public.  The Article 
concludes by proposing dynamic federalism principles for designing 
institutions that are responsive to these governance challenges 
through (1) creating needed authority; (2) reducing fragmentation; 
and (3) allowing for high levels of involvement from key public and 
private stakeholders that accommodates meaningful input without 
capture.  It also introduces our next article, Hybrid Energy Gov-
ernance, which applies these principles through detailed case stud-
ies to assess institutional innovation in areas critical to energy 
transformation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the hot and humid summer of 2012, more than three million 
residents in the District of Columbia and nearby states lost power, and 
more than twenty people died.1  The effects spread nationwide as Net-
flix and Amazon servers in the D.C. area went down.2  For days, resi-
dents in the mid-Atlantic region suffered from continued high tem-
peratures and a lack of air conditioning.3  The immediate causes of 
this massive disruption were trees falling on power lines during severe 
storms.4  But the broader factors underlying this incident illuminate 
the complexities of the U.S. energy system and the novel governance 
challenges that it faces. 
First, energy stands alone in its level of physical interconnected-
ness: Any one failure in the wires that transport electricity can cause 
extensive rolling blackouts, as seen in Washington, D.C., New Jersey, 
and Illinois in June 2012.5  Powerful storms like Hurricane Sandy, 
which scientists project will become more common with climate 
                                                        
 1.  Washington’s Power Cuts: Taken By Trees, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21558302. 
 2.  Alon Harish, Rare “Derecho” Storm Ravaged Washington Area, ABC NEWS (July 2, 
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/derecho-storm-ravaged-washington-area/story?id=166 
96593#.UBNhLfVRBM8. 
 3.  Michael Schwirtz, Many Still Without Electricity in Mid-Atlantic States, N.Y. TIMES (July 
1, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/us/mid-atlantic-braces-for-more-storms-
and-heat.html?_r=1&ref=washingtondc. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See Washington’s Power Cuts: Taken By Trees, supra note 1 (describing the geographic 
breadth of the outage). 
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change, cause larger disruptions and call for an updated, more flexi-
ble system of generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity.6 
Second, we increasingly rely on energy for our every task—largely 
due to the computerization of our economy.7  Disruptions in the en-
ergy system can have widespread market impacts, as evidenced by that 
summer’s brief but widespread outage of services used by millions of 
people.8 
Finally, these physical and market forces interact with a multi-
level regulatory system, requiring the coordination of actors across 
city and state (and increasingly, international) lines and among vari-
ous levels of government.  Pepco, the utility that was largely blamed 
for the power outage, for example, is a regional entity that serves 
Maryland and D.C. customers.9  Its regulators include both the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation—a public-private federal 
institution with regional components10—and the state-level Maryland 
Public Service Commission, which had earlier fined the utility for ex-
cessive outages due largely to poor communication with individual 
utility consumers.11 
                                                        
 6.  Operations Update: Hurricane Sandy, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/~/media/ 
committees-groups/committees/oc/20121106/20121106-item-04-hurricane-sandy.ashx 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (assessing the impacts of the hurricane and reporting prelimi-
nary data, noting “140 transmission lines out of service,” 40 offline generators, and approx-
imately 5 million customers without service during the peak of the problems, and observ-
ing that customer outages were “[h]igher than both the 6/29/2012 Derecho and 
Hurricane Irene”); cf. Despite Customer Outages, Wholesale Electric Markets Operated During 
Hurricane Sandy, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy 
/detail.cfm?id=8750 (describing how a relatively flexible, regional governance entity called 
the regional transmission organization, which has some of the needed characteristics of 
coordination that we introduce in this Article, kept wholesale energy markets relatively 
stable during the hurricane, although more than eight million customers lost power and 
transmission lines and substations were damaged). 
 7.  Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, Paying Too Much for Energy? The True Costs of 
our Energy Choices, 141 J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 10, 10 (2012). 
 8.  See Harish, supra note 2 (describing the storm that knocked out an Amazon serv-
er). 
 9.  About, PEPCO, http://www.pepco.com/welcome/ (last visited July 27, 2012). 
 10.  About NERC: Company Overview, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc. 
com/page.php?cid=1|7 (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). 
 11.  See Washington’s Power Cuts: Taken By Trees, supra note 1 (describing the fine).  But 
see Aaron C. Davis & Mary Pat Flaherty, Pepco Defends its Response to Derecho Storm, Saying it 
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This example of power disruption in the mid-Atlantic states is not 
unique.  Weather extremes that affect the electricity grid have be-
come more common,12 and, throughout energy law, seemingly 
straightforward and distinct problems involve complex interactions 
among components of the physical electricity grid and its sources, the 
markets that drive fuel extraction and the generation and movement 
of electricity, and the relevant law and institutions at multiple levels of 
government.13  These interactions create an important federalism 
challenge: How can energy regulation and its institutions create more 
effective multi-level governance structures to meet our need for 
cheap, clean, and reliable electricity as technology changes and as 
customers demand more sustainable energy solutions? 
Efforts in energy law scholarship and policy to address this ques-
tion largely reflect the fragmented nature of the energy system; they 
address different sources and institutions within the self-contained 
categories that the energy law system has created for them.  Numer-
ous scholarly articles tackle particular issues, such as whether a federal 
renewable energy standard should supplant existing state law regimes, 
or how to overcome state law barriers to interstate transmission lines.14  
None of these analyses, however, creates a holistic model for concep-
tualizing energy federalism approaches across the full system.  U.S. 
energy policymakers similarly tend to suggest solutions that fail to ad-
dress the full complexity of the system.  Recent proposals from both 
sides of the political aisle, and the resulting debates, generally have 
addressed the appropriate roles of state and federal government on 
particular energy issues without nuanced discussion of how the parts 
fit together into an overall multi-level governance approach.15  These 
                                                        
“Mobilized Quickly,” WASH. POST (July 30, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
pepco-defends-its-response-to-derecho-storm-saying-it-mobilized-quickly/2012/07/30/ 
gJQAmxuVLX_story.html (explaining Pepco’s defense of its response time after the 
derecho). 
 12.  Matthew L. Wald & John Schwartz, Rise in Weather Extremes Threatens Infrastructure, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, at A4. 
 13.  See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Institutions and Long Term Planning: Lessons from the Cal-
ifornia Electricity Crisis, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 96–101 (2003) (describing the complexities of 
California’s energy grid). 
 14.  For examples of this narrowly focused scholarship, see infra notes 151–152. 
 15.  See Jennifer A. Diouhy, Drilling Down: 5 Major Differences in Obama, Romney Energy 
Plans, CHRON.COM (Aug. 23, 2012), http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2012/08/drilling-
down-5-major-differences-in-obama-romney-energy-plans/ (comparing the two presidential 
candidates’ energy plans prior to the 2012 election). 
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silos, through which we address issues individually, limit our under-
standing of shared patterns and opportunities for synergistic learn-
ing.16  They also contribute to continued failures in efforts toward a 
comprehensive, longer-term energy policy. 
This Article will begin to provide a needed, more holistic ap-
proach by proposing a novel model for understanding the energy sys-
tem, its federalism dynamics, and resulting governance challenges.  
Through mapping interactions among different levels of government 
(from local to international) and key entities at each level of govern-
ment, this dynamic federalism model goes well beyond questions of 
the appropriateness of federal versus state regulatory authority.  It 
categorizes these interactions both with respect to the common chal-
lenges that they create and the solutions needed to overcome them, 
thus providing a better understanding of patterns and offering solu-
tions grounded in nuanced federalism principles. 
This model reveals patterns of inadequate regulatory authority; 
simultaneous overlap and fragmentation; and entities in public regu-
latory roles enmeshed with, and at times partially made up of, the pri-
vate actors that they ostensibly regulate across numerous types of en-
ergy law.  These patterns provide the basis for the Article’s 
recommendations of principles for developing energy law institutions 
that navigate federalism dynamics more effectively: (1) creation of 
needed authority; (2) reduction of fragmentation; and (3) provision 
of mechanisms for high levels of involvement from key public and 
private stakeholders that allow for meaningful input without capture, 
such as when powerful utilities or oil companies gain control of regu-
latory processes to protect their private interests at the expense of the 
public.  Our next article, Hybrid Energy Governance, will assess institu-
tions that have begun to incorporate these strategies in multiple areas 
of energy law critical to addressing modern energy challenges.17 
Through its ambitious, synthetic approach to energy law, this Ar-
ticle will make important theoretical and practical contributions.  
Theoretically, it will argue against forcing energy law into existing, 
constrained understandings of federalism and instead for creating a 
more dynamic, nuanced model for federalism analysis.  Our federal-
ism model also infuses governance issues into federalism, showing 
                                                        
 16.  For an in-depth discussion of the current state of energy law federalism scholar-
ship and the need for a dynamic model, see infra Part II.A. 
 17.  Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, __ ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=214 
7860. 
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that questions about how different levels of government interact can-
not be separated from the construction of institutions and their deci-
sion-making processes; these complex interactions create challenges 
for such construction and opportunities for innovation.  This model 
therefore provides a new way of conceptualizing the field that is 
grounded in the unique characteristics of the energy system. 
Practically, this Article’s approach could help foster a needed re-
thinking of energy governance.  It will demonstrate how common 
characteristics of energy governance systems constrain effectiveness, 
and it will model how to analyze these patterns, which allows for large-
ly separate areas of energy law to learn from one another.  It will then 
propose principles for more effective institutional construction 
grounded in the more dynamic understanding of federalism and gov-
ernance that we have proposed.  These principles are not simply the-
oretical ones.  They provide the basis for our next article’s assessment 
of regulatory innovation in the context of hybrid regional institu-
tions18 that have begun to make progress toward managing risky, un-
conventional fuel extraction technologies like hydraulic fracturing19 
and deepwater drilling appropriately; providing adequate pathways to 
update our aging electrical grid and implement smart grid approach-
es; and allowing us to integrate cleaner sources onto it effectively. 
Part I of this Article will map the interacting physical, market, 
and regulatory dimensions of the energy system.  Part II then will con-
sider the federalism implications of this complex system; it will argue 
for the need for a more holistic, dynamic approach to energy federal-
ism and will map the simultaneous vertical (multi-level) and horizon-
tal (same level) interactions taking place across energy law.  Part III 
will explore the contours of the specific governance problems that 
these federalism interactions create, with a focus on the above-
described patterns.  This Article will conclude by proposing principles 
that could help address these governance problems and introducing 
our application of these principles in a series of pieces analyzing en-
ergy federalism and governance. 
                                                        
 18.  For a definition of “hybrid regional governance,” see id. (manuscript at 6–9). 
 19.  Hydraulic fracturing is also called “fracking,” “fracing,” or “hydrofracking.”  Hy-
draulic Fracturing, ASS’N OF AM. STATE GEOLOGISTS [hereinafter Fracking Fact Sheet], 
http://www.stategeologists.org/temp/AASG%20Hydraulic%20Fracturing%20statement.p
df (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).  For further discussion of “fracking” terminology, see Han-
nah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 233 
n.22 (2010). 
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I.  THE TRIPARTITE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. ENERGY SYSTEM 
The production and movement of energy presents one of the 
greatest governance challenges of our time.  The physical processes 
that underlie much of our modern energy system—including primary 
energy extraction and transportation and the generation, transporta-
tion, and distribution of electricity (secondary energy)20—are neces-
sary to sustain human life as we know it and yet are unusually complex 
and difficult to manage.  Because energy is at the core of every human 
necessity, from enabling the provision of food, shelter, and clothing 
to driving economic growth and essential interpersonal communica-
tions, it is inextricably intertwined with fundamental societal values of 
fairness, justice, economic opportunity, and environmental protec-
tion.  As humans demand energy transformation in the form of 
cleaner, more affordable, and more accessible energy, and as tech-
nology introduces new opportunities and challenges into an already 
complex system,21 these developments run up against the boundaries 
of traditional governance structures and create the need for rapid 
regulatory innovation.  This innovation, in turn, requires new theoret-
ical approaches to governance, and particularly to federalism—the 
guiding force behind decisions about interactions among governmen-
tal and nongovernmental actors across levels of government. 
This Part delineates the complex grid of physical, market, and 
regulatory interactions that form the current U.S. energy system and 
drive its governance challenges.  As illustrated in Figure 1, the energy 
system in the United States is a tripartite structure comprised of phys-
ical infrastructure and sources, market forces, and regulations that 
both shape and are shaped by these physical and market forces.  This 
system simultaneously drives and constrains regulatory innovation at 
the domestic level,22 which in turn forces unique interactions among 
regulatory peers as well as among different levels of government. 
                                                        
 20.  In addition to secondary energy (electricity), we rely—although decreasingly so—
on primary energy, which is fuel burned to directly power something or produce heat, 
such as in a car or furnace. 
 21.  For a full discussion of energy transitions, see Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17. 
 22.  Indeed, due to the interconnected nature of energy, it is increasingly difficult to 
separate domestic from international regulation.  The North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation, for example, writes and implements standards intended to guarantee the 
provision of a constant and adequate supply of electricity in the United States and several 
Canadian provinces.  See Governance: Canada, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 
http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1|8|293 (last visited  July 10, 2012) (showing memo-
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the demand for these energy sources does not match their spatial dis-
tribution, the resources must be moved from their points of produc-
tion or generation to end users domestically and internationally.24 
Coal is easily stored and moved by rail or ship,25 while natural gas 
often is pressurized or liquefied for efficient long-distance transport26 
and gas storage is available but more limited.27  Oil and natural gas 
are often transported by pipeline, although depending on the form in 
which the fuel is transported and the distance of transport, trucks, 
ships, and rail are also used.28  Nuclear energy consumes comparative-
                                                        
 24.  The longer the transmission distance, the more electricity is lost in the process.  
Electricity losses are calculated based on total electricity generated multiplied by the “dis-
tance from the source to the load [electricity demand]” multiplied by a phase calculation 
and all divided by the voltage (in kilovolts).  Benjamin I. Phillips & Richard S. Middleton, 
SimWIND: A Geospatial Infrastructure Model for Optimizing Wind Generation and Transmission, 
43 ENERGY POL’Y 291, 296 (2012); see also id. (explaining that transmission line type and 
length are critical factors in transmission loss and explaining that for a 750-kilovolt line 
with an input of 4,352 megawatts, losses are 5.42% over 500 kilometers and 10.83% over 
1,000 kilometers). 
 25.  Transporters now primarily rely on rail, rather than barges, to transport coal with-
in the United States.  See Jeffrey K. Lazo & Katherine T. McClain, Community Perceptions, 
Environmental Impacts, and Energy Policy: Rail Shipment of Coal, 24 ENERGY POL’Y 531, 532 
(1996) (describing the transition from barges to rail transport); Coal Transportation Issues, 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2007), http://205.254.135.7/oiaf/aeo/otheranalysis/cti.html 
(“Most of the coal delivered to U.S. consumers is transported by railroads, which account-
ed for 64 percent of total domestic coal shipments in 2004.”); Today in Energy: Coal Stock-
piles Above Five-Year Range in First Quarter of 2012, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 31, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6490 (describing coal stockpiles at pow-
er plants). 
 26.  See Natural Gas: About U.S. Natural Gas Pipelines, Transportation Process and Flow, 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://205.254.135.7/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_ 
publications/ngpipeline/process.html (last visited July 10, 2012) (explaining that com-
pressor stations “increase the pressure and rate of flow, and thus, maintain the movement 
of natural gas along the pipeline”).  Gas transported internationally is often liquefied. 
 27.  See id. (describing “depleted reservoirs in oil and/or gas fields, aquifers, and salt 
cavern formations” that store natural gas in the United States); MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE 
FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS 3 (2011), available at http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/ 
studies/documents/natural-gas-2011/NaturalGas_Report.pdf (noting that “because of its 
gaseous form and low energy density, natural gas is uniquely disadvantaged in terms of 
transmission and storage”). 
 28.  See MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 27, at 3 (explaining that “[a]s a liquid, oil can 
be readily transported over any distance by a variety of means” but that “the vast majority 
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ly little fuel and relies on existing highways for transport, but 
transport of this fuel is a riskier process.29  Renewable energy genera-
tors, in contrast, must move to the fuel; they must locate a spot on the 
globe with sunlight, wind, or other resources that are sufficiently 
abundant to support economically feasible electricity production and 
then transport their product through wires.30 
The uneven global and domestic distribution of the various fuels, 
and particularly the increasing reliance upon secondary energy (elec-
tricity) within the United States, causes many of the complications in 
the physical domestic energy picture.  The United States has abun-
dant natural gas, coal, and renewable resources,31 and indeed more 
                                                        
of natural gas supplies are delivered to market by pipeline”); see also Wendy N. Duong, 
Partnerships with Monarchs—Two Case Studies: Case Two Partnerships with Monarchs in the De-
velopment of Energy Resources: Dissecting an Independent Power Project and Re-Evaluating the Role 
of Multilateral and Project Financing in the International Energy Sector, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 69, 70–71 (2005) (“Crude oil can be shipped all over the world.  On the other hand, 
natural gas transportation by ship is only economically feasible if the natural gas is lique-
fied—the cooling and compression needed to ‘shrink’ the gas from its original volume.” 
(citing A. Kaplan & Graham Marshall, World LNG Trade Responding to Increased Natural Gas 
Demand, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 24, 2003, at 74)). 
 29.  Cf. Lucas W. Davis, Prospects for Nuclear Power, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49, 58–59 
(2012) (explaining that “fuel expenditures represent a relatively small proportion of the 
total cost of nuclear power”); Marvin Baker Schaffer, Toward a Viable Nuclear Waste Disposal 
Program, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1382, 1387 (2011) (noting the risk of an “[a]ccident or terrorist 
attack while transporting casks,” of nuclear waste in the nuclear waste disposal (not fuel) 
context, but concluding that “no explosion would occur internal to the casks” and that 
radioactive dispersal would be limited to “a few meters”). 
 30.  See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TRANSMISSION PRICING ISSUES FOR ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES 3 (1998) [hereinafter TRANSMISSION PRICING], 
available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/features/transprc.pdf (noting that nonrenewable fuels 
can be moved from the point of extraction to the power plant and that renewables lack 
this advantage).  For an analysis of the technical and policy issues of integrating renewa-
bles into grids globally, see Christof Timpe et al., Scoping Paper: Integration of Electricity from 
Renewable Energy Sources into European Electricity Grids (ETC/ACC Technical Paper, 2010), 
available at http://acm.eionet.europa.eu/reports/docs/ETCACC_TP_2010_18_REG_ 
Integration.pdf. 
 31.  Energy In Brief: What Is the Role of Coal in the United States?, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://205.254.135.7/energy_in_brief/role_coal_us.cfm (updated July 18, 2012) (“The 
United States is home to the largest estimated recoverable reserves of coal in the world.  In 
fact, we have enough coal to last more than 200 years, based on current production lev-
els.”); Energy In Brief: What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
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oil than previously thought.32  But we still rely on fuel imports for 
about a quarter of our energy mix,33 especially for transportation,34 
and the resources within our borders—fuels that we rely on for the 
bulk of our energy—are concentrated within certain regions.  The 
Midwest has extensive wind resources35 and relatively few electricity 
users, for example, thus requiring massive new investments in trans-
mission if its energy resources are to be effectively harnessed, whereas 
the Southeast has comparatively few renewable or fossil fuels.36 
                                                        
http://205.254.135.7/energy_in_brief/about_shale_gas.cfm (updated July 9, 2012) (“The 
availability of large quantities of shale gas should enable the United States to consume a 
predominantly domestic supply of gas for many years and produce more natural gas than 
it consumes.”); DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND BY 2030: INCREASING WIND ENERGY’S 
CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (2008) (explaining that we have the potential 
to produce 20% of electricity from wind by 2030). 
 32.  INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 23, at 75 (projecting that the United States will 
be “97% energy self sufficient in net terms” due to an “upward trend” in oil production, 
declining oil imports, .and rising production of gas and renewables). 
 33.  Net energy imports in 2007 accounted for 29% of all U.S. energy production and 
consumption.  This dropped to 22% in 2010 due to the recession, and the Energy Infor-
mation Administration (“EIA”) predicts that it will drop further to 13% by 2035 due pri-
marily to onshore “tight oil” production (the production of oil from shales and tight sands 
using hydraulic fracturing and other technologies). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AEO 2012 
EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 8 (2012), available at www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er 
(2012).pdf; see also Michael Cohen, A Renaissance in U.S. Production: Light Tight Oil, J. INT’L 
ENERGY ADMIN., Autumn 2012, at 31 (defining “tight oil”). 
 34.  See Dependence on Foreign Oil, supra note 32 (showing that net imports accounted for 
45% of U.S. petroleum demand in 2011); ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 
2011, at Table 5.13a–d (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/ 
pdf/aer.pdf (showing that transportation accounted for more than 13 million barrels per 
day of petroleum use in 2011 as compared to 357,000 barrels per day for the residential 
sector, more than 4 million for the industrial sector, and 130,000 for the electricity sector). 
 35.  Wind Powering America, Utility-Scale Land-Based 80-Meter Wind Maps, DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_maps.asp (last updated Sept. 12, 
2012) (showing the highest average onshore wind speed 80 meters above ground as occur-
ring throughout the Midwest). 
 36.  See Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political Economy Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity 
Requirement, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 367 (2011) (noting that “southeastern states have 
strong potential for biomass development, but in comparison to most western states, they 
have very limited opportunities for the development of wind, solar, and geothermal”); State 
Energy Data System, 2011 Estimates, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/beta/state/ 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
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The environmental and social impacts of global and domestic 
fuels also differ substantially, which complicates decisions about 
whether and where to build new infrastructure to transport fuels and 
electricity.  Wind farms disrupt habitat and the breeding routines of 
endangered birds, kill bats, and have non-negligible visual and noise 
impacts.37  Extraction of oil and natural gas, which increasingly re-
quires unconventional technologies,38 has polluted valuable natural 
resources, and spills have had catastrophic social and economic ef-
fects.39  Coal extraction, of which sixty percent is now surface min-
ing,40 has similarly created short-term jobs but has destroyed some 
communities and polluted surface waters.41  Further, all fossil fuels 
                                                        
 37.  See FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., LAND-BASED WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES 2012, at 1, 
available at http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/WEG_final.pdf (summarizing studies 
that describe bird and bat fatalities caused by wind energy equipment); R.H. Bakker et al., 
Impact of Wind Turbine Sound on Annoyance, Self-Reported Sleep Disturbance and Psychological 
Distress, 425 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 42, 46–48 (2012) (finding a significant positive correlation 
between noise from wind turbines and psychological distress). 
 38.  Jennifer L. Miskimins et al., The Technical Aspects of Hydraulic Fracturing, ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. FOUND., no. 5 (2011) (“Unconventional resources exist in petroleum accu-
mulations that are pervasive throughout a large area and that are not significantly affected 
by hydrodynamic influences,” and that have “low flow capabilities”); id. (explaining that 
hydraulic fracturing is “[r]equired for unconventional reservoirs”); HALLIBURTON, U.S. 
SHALE GAS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL RESOURCE, UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES 3, available 
at http://www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/contents/shale/related_docs/H063771. 
pdf (describing horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing as “key enabling technologies” 
in the Barnett Shale of Texas, a very productive source of U.S. gas). 
 39.  See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING at 1 (2011), http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf (reporting that, in total, the BP oil well 
incident in the Gulf of Mexico released more than 4 million barrels of oil). 
 40.  Secure and Reliable Energy Supplies—Brief Overview of Coal Mining, NAT’L ENERGY 
TECH. LAB., http://www.netl.doe.gov/KeyIssues/overviewofmining.html; see also ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., COAL PRODUCTION AND NUMBER OF MINES BY STATE AND MINE TYPE, 2010, 
2009, available at http://205.254.135.7/coal/annual/pdf/table1.pdf (showing surface and 
underground mining numbers by state); see also Western Surface Coal Mining, § 11.9.1, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/ap42/ch11/final/c11s09.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2013) (describing the western surface coal mining process, in which topsoil 
is scraped away and “the earth that is between the topsoil and coal seam . . . is leveled, 
drilled, and blasted”). 
 41.  See, e.g., Memorandum from the Envtl. Protection Agency, Improving EPA Review 
of Appalachian Surface Coal Mining Operations Under the Clean Water Act, National En-
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emit greenhouse gases when burned,42 causing an environmental cri-
sis of global proportions.  Expanding knowledge about the compara-
tive carbon emissions of these fuels, and particularly the lower but still 
substantial climate impact of natural gas,43 affects fuel choices and has 
begun to significantly change electricity generation in the United 
States.  Most new power plants use natural gas44 rather than coal,45 for 
                                                        
vironmental Policy Act, and the Environmental Justice Executive Order, at 4 (July 21, 
2011), available at http://appvoices.org/images/uploads/2012/08/Final_Appalachian_ 
Mining_Guidance_07211111.pdf (“The environmental legacy of [surface] mining opera-
tions . . . is far-reaching [and poses] new environmental and health challenges that were 
largely unknown even ten years ago.”).  Coal also provides important jobs for communi-
ties—often the only jobs currently available within these communities.  This perpetuates 
boom and bust cycles, however, which leave communities stranded when the resource is 
no longer abundant.  Dan Black et al., The Economic Impact of the Coal Boom and Bust, 115 
ECON. J. 449, 463–68 (2005) (studying changes in employment and other economic effects 
of boom and bust cycles caused by coal extraction). 
 42.  See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990–2010, paper 430-R-12-001, at 2–5 to 2–7, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf [hereinafter GHG 
INVENTORY] (showing greenhouse gas emissions by gas and source). 
 43.  Estimates of these emissions vary widely, but some scientists believe that “on a per-
joule basis, burning methane, the primary constituent of natural gas, produces less carbon 
dioxide than burning coal.”  Richard Lovett, Natural Gas Greenhouse Emissions Study Draws 
Fire, NATURE (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110415/full/news.2011 
.242.html.  Lifecycle emissions are of course higher due to methane leakage during the 
drilling and fracturing process and from pipelines.  See MARK FULTON, WORLDWATCH 
INSTITUTE, COMPARING LIFE-CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM NATURAL GAS AND 
COAL 2 (2011), available at http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/pdf/Natural_Gas_ 
LCA_Update_082511.pdf (describing the author’s methodology to calculate greenhouse 
gas emissions from natural gas, which incorporated methane emissions as a “byproduct of 
petroleum production” and “the natural gas that passes through distribution pipelines”). 
 44.  Today in Energy (2011), ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://205.254.135.7/todayinenergy 
/detail.cfm?id=2070 (explaining that new natural gas-fired plants represented “81% of to-
tal generation capacity additions” from 2000–2010). 
 45.  See U.S. Coal’s Share of Total Net Generation Continues to Decline, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(June 5, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6550 (noting declines in 
the use of coal compared to other fuel types); Monthly Coal- and Natural Gas-Fired Generation 
Equal for the First Time in April 2012, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 6, 2012), 
http://205.254.135.7/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6990 (noting that although coal has 
historically dominated U.S. electricity generation, “for the first time since EIA began col-
lecting the data,” natural gas and coal contributed equally to power generation in April 
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example, and some existing plants are switching to natural gas.46  
Plummeting natural gas prices and an abundant supply also have dis-
couraged renewable generation despite its positive climate impacts.47 
This Article focuses primarily on secondary energy (electricity) 
and the many complex fuel and transportation choices underlying 
electricity production, although it also considers the parallel risks and 
inequities of unconventional fuel development that cross-cut the pri-
mary and secondary energy systems.  It chooses this focus because 
electricity occupies a large share of U.S. energy consumption48 and 
contributes to a similarly large proportion of energy impacts: Electric-
ity generation produced approximately one third of U.S. greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2010.49  Indeed, our trajectory seems to be moving 
even more rapidly toward secondary sources of energy as we begin to 
plug in cars50 and continue to computerize a variety of systems. 
Traditionally, electricity is generated at large power plants and 
then moved to utilities and ultimately to customers,51 and this same 
pattern can occur at much smaller scales through distributed genera-
tion and microgrids.  Production and distribution still generally take 
place in a more confined physical area than generation and transmis-
                                                        
2012, each contributing “32% of total generation”); Clifford Krauss, Breaking Away from 
Coal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/business/energy-
environment/30utilities.html?pagewanted=all (“Over the last year and a half, at least 10 
power companies have announced plans to close more than three dozen of their oldest, 
least efficient coal-burning generators by 2019.  A few are being replaced by new, more 
efficient coal plants, but many more are being replaced by gas-fired plants.”). 
 46.  See supra notes 44–45. 
 47.  See infra note 93. 
 48.  Of the sectors that consume primary energy, such as the industrial, transportation, 
and electric power sectors, the highest percentage (40% of primary energy consumption) 
is the electric power sector. Annual Energy Review, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 2012), 
http://205.254.135.7/totalenergy/data/annual/pecss_diagram.cfm. 
 49.  GHG INVENTORY, supra note 42. 
 50.  See Availability of Hybrid and Plug-In Electric Vehicles, ALTERNATIVE FUELS DATA 
CENTER, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric_availability.html 
(last visited July 31, 2012) (“A number of light-, medium-, and heavy-duty hybrid electric 
vehicles (HEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), and all-electric vehicles (EVs) 
are available from a variety of automakers or are in development.”). 
 51.  See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRIC REGULATION IN THE U.S.: A GUIDE 
9–11 & Fig. 4.1 (2011) [hereinafter RAP GUIDE], www.raponline.org/document/ 
download/id/645 (providing an overview of the organization of the U.S. electric industry 
and illustrating the elements of the grid). 
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sion.52  Within the most common domestic secondary energy system, a 
typical generator of electricity pipes in fuel or receives it by rail, burns 
it to produce electricity, and then sells its product wholesale to utili-
ties or directly to industry users.53  In order to transport electricity to 
the relevant markets, generators connect to a large network of trans-
mission lines, which are typically built and owned by utilities.54  Histor-
ically, utilities that owned and controlled transmission lines also 
owned generation facilities and distribution lines and were thus “ver-
tically-integrated”;55 in many states, this system has not changed.56 
The utility or regional organization that controls the transmis-
sion lines bargains with generators regarding the terms of connection 
and use of the line and ultimately enters into an interconnection 
agreement with them.57  This agreement emerges only after the entity 
                                                        
 52.  See Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl With Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 551 
(2010) (explaining that energy microgrids are an attractive policy choice because “[t]hey 
decentralize energy production, reducing the need for nationwide transmission lines and 
large-scale centralized plants”). 
 53.  W.M. WARWICK, DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, 
DEREGULATION, AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 2.2 (2002). 
 54.  Traditionally, vertically integrated utilities owned and operated transmission and 
distribution lines as well as generation.  Increasingly, however, independent, transmission-
only utilities own and operate lines.  See, e.g., About Electric Transmission Texas, ELEC. 
TRANSMISSION TEX., http://www.ettexas.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (describ-
ing a joint venture between American Electric Power, which “owns the nation’s largest 
electricity transmission system, a nearly 39,000-mile network that includes more than 765 
kilovolt extra-high voltage transmission lines than all other United States transmission sys-
tems combined” and MidAmerican to form an independent transmission-only utility). 
 55.  RAP GUIDE, supra note 51, at 10. 
 56.  In 2010, electric utilities owned approximately sixty-two percent of “nameplate” 
generating capacity (the technical potential output of generation capacity). Electric Power 
Annual 2010, Existing Capacity by Producer Type, 2010, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 2010), 
http://205.254.135.7/electricity/annual/pdf/table1.3.pdf (comparing the capacity of 
“electric utilities” and “independent power producers”).  The EIA definition of electric 
utilities appears to generally align with vertically integrated utilities, as it defines the utility 
as “[a] corporation, person, agency, authority, or other legal entity or instrumentality 
aligned with distribution facilities for delivery of electric energy for use primarily by the 
public.” Glossary, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id= 
E#el_utility.  Those utilities that both distribute and generate electricity, as described in 
the EIA capacity report, are at least partially vertically integrated. 
 57.  Stephen M. Fisher, Note, Reforming Interconnection Queue Management Under FERC 
Order No. 2003, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 129 (2009) (explaining that after conducting inter-
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that controls the lines ensures that there is room in the lines for addi-
tional electricity and that the new generating source will not interfere 
with smooth grid operations.58  In addition to accommodating indi-
vidual interconnections, the transmission utility or a regional institu-
tion manages the flow of electricity through the wires.59  After identify-
ing the “load” (electricity demanded by load serving entities—those 
that provide electricity to consumers) and the amount of electricity 
available from generators, the line operator balances these two factors 
and sets the quantity of electricity that flows through transmission 
lines.60  The operator must maintain a relatively constant voltage in 
the lines, and thus carefully regulate flow, to avoid major outages,61 
which often spread instantaneously through an interconnected 
transmission system.62  It also must provide electricity at the moment 
                                                        
connection studies to determine whether the transmission line can accommodate genera-
tion, “the transmission provider and interconnection customer then negotiate any remain-
ing transaction-specific provisions” and enter into an interconnection agreement). 
 58.  See id. (describing interconnection studies, including feasibility studies, as a means 
“to ensure the proposed interconnection is reasonable from engineering and economic 
perspectives”). 
 59.  See Mason Willrich, Electricity Transmission Policy for America: Enabling a Smart Grid, 
End-to-End 18–19 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., MIT-IPC-Energy Innovation Working Paper 09-003, 
2009), available at http://web.mit.edu/ipc/research/energy/pdf/EIP_09-003.pdf (de-
scribing RTOs—grid operators— and their markets). 
 60.  See id. at 19.  The electricity market varies by regional transmission organiza-
tion/grid operator and is far more complex than the brief description provided here.  
Some have capacity markets, for example, where generators bid in actual capacities to pro-
vide power in the future, while others do not.  Id. 
 61.  K. Ramar & M.S. Raviprakasha, Design of Compensation Schemes for Long AC Transmis-
sion Lines for Maximum Power Transfer Limited by Voltage Stability, 17 ELECTRICAL POWER & 
ENERGY SYS. 83, 83 (1995) (explaining that instability in the transmission system “may be 
caused primarily by the loss of synchronism of one or more generating units . . . or by the 
uncontrollable decay of system voltage over a significant portion of the network (voltage 
instability)” and that voltage stability is the ability to “maintain stable load voltage magni-
tudes”). 
 62.  SPENCER ABRAHAM, SEC. OF ENERGY, DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION 
GRID STUDY 2 (2002), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/ 
TransmissionGrid.pdf (“Within each system, disturbances or reliability events are felt near-
ly instantaneously throughout the system.”). 
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that it is demanded because large-scale electricity storage is not yet 
available.63 
This dual mandate—accommodating fluctuating generation and 
demand while maintaining a relatively constant voltage in the lines 
and ensuring instantaneous availability of the product to be con-
sumed—is a core challenge of grid management.64  Transmission line 
owners are wary of intermittent generation sources, such as solar and 
wind, which send unpredictable amounts of electricity through the 
wires.65  The smart grid, including improved technological ability to 
predict availability of renewable resources, has begun to alleviate this 
hurdle; computers incorporated within the grid can instantaneously 
draw in new generation sources when needed and better predict and 
balance supply and demand.66  Much progress remains to be made, 
however, and computerization of the grid as part of a nationwide 
smart grid initiative has expanded some reliability concerns.67  In 
                                                        
 63.  But see Marc Beaudin et al., Energy Storage for Mitigating the Variability of Renewable 
Electricity Source: An Updated Review, 14 ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 302, 311–12 (2010) 
(describing research efforts in energy storage). 
 64.  See David K. Detton, Contracting to Sell or Buy Electricity § 5, in THE ELECTRIC 
INDUSTRY: OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACTS FOR RESOURCE PRODUCERS, POWER GENERATORS, 
MARKETERS, AND CONSUMERS (1996) (“Unlike natural gas, . . . the physical characteristics 
of electricity not only make storage impractical, but impose unique ‘real time’ supply, de-
livery, and damage mitigation requirements.”). 
 65.  See, e.g., Pedro J. Pizarro, Executive Vice President of Power Operations for South-
ern Cal. Edison Co., Remarks at the FERC Technical Conference: Integrating Renewable 
Resources into the Wholesale Electric Grid (AD09-4), at 4 (Mar. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20090302090557-Pizarro,%20SoCal%20 
Edison-EEI.pdf (noting that higher levels of renewable generation “can result in signifi-
cant amounts of surplus energy that cannot be used on the grid or sold to others,” in 
which case power must be offloaded, and that the grid requires “higher Planning Reserve 
Margins to back up the system when these intermittent resources are incapable of produc-
ing sufficient energy”). 
 66.  See, e.g., ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC CORPORATION, USING SMART GRIDS TO ENHANCE 
USE OF ENERGY-EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE-ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 3.4 (2011), available at 
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-20389.pdf 
(“Smart grid technologies, such as transmission and distribution automation and active 
distributed energy resources, allow a diverse and changing mix of renewable-energy re-
sources to be accommodated on the grid.”). 
 67.  See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FROM THE 
INTEGRATION OF SMART GRID 70 (2010), http://www.nerc.com/files/SGTF_Report_Final_ 
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many cases, renewable generators also lack access to transmission 
even when interconnection is theoretically possible, as abundant re-
newable resources tend to be located in rural areas far from existing 
transmission lines.68 
A utility that receives electricity from a transmission line ultimate-
ly distributes this electricity to retail customers through smaller, lower-
voltage lines.69  The combination of large transmission lines and 
smaller distribution lines for electricity forms a massive physical sys-
tem called the transmission grid.70  Together, the physical movement 
of fuel to generators and of electricity to utilities and consumers 
frame the markets that are the subject of the following Section. 
B.  Market 
The demand for energy resources paired with their uneven dis-
tribution and resulting transportation challenges creates a market for 
energy that interacts with each stage of the energy provision process.  
This Section traces the ways in which the energy market, in its interac-
tion with the underlying physical resources introduced above, forms a 
complex, difficult-to-regulate structure.  It first describes the evolving 
economic structure of the market and then considers the market 
forces at the primary stages of the energy provision process: genera-
tion and its accompanying fuels, transmission, and distribution. 
United States energy markets must navigate both the increasing 
transnational interconnections within historically regional and na-
tional markets and the partial evolution away from treating our do-
mestic energy markets as natural monopolies (markets in which it 
would be economically inefficient to have more than one provider, 
often because of large infrastructure investments).  Oil is the most in-
ternational of the fuel markets in terms of its global price and its 
transnational network of pipelines, while natural gas and electricity 
                                                        
posted.pdf (noting the vulnerability of a complex and interconnected smart grid to cyber-
attacks). 
 68.  See TRANSMISSION PRICING, supra note 30, at 3 (describing the remote location of 
certain renewable resources and noting, for example, that viable solar thermal generation 
is limited to the southwestern United States). 
 69.  ABRAHAM, supra note 62, at 90. 
 70.  Id. at 2.  Not all wires are connected, though; the United States has three major 
grids—the Eastern, Western, and Texas Interconnections—which are physically separated.  
Id.  If one distribution or transmission line within any one of these grids fails, the effects 
can spiral through large portions of each interconnection, as shown by historical blackouts 
and rolling brownouts.  Id. at 2, 20. 
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have traditionally been regional in nature.71  This difference is largely 
due to particular physical limitations of each type of energy in our 
tripartite structure, as noted above.  For example, natural gas typically 
must be liquefied before being shipped long distances, which requires 
expensive facilities; these facilities are not yet common but likely will 
expand as natural gas supplies worldwide increase.72  Indeed, several 
applications for liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) export terminals are 
currently pending before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”).73  Electricity, too, has remained largely regional because of 
the expense of constructing transmission lines across oceans and oth-
er natural and artificial barriers that divide countries.74  Governance 
of energy is slowly becoming formally international, however, as more 
electricity flows within transnational regions and neighboring coun-
tries begin to enlist common governing entities, such as the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”), with jurisdiction 
both within the United States and parts of Canada.75  The influence of 
international factors on U.S. energy markets, governance, and even its 
physical infrastructure will likely continue to expand along with this 
slow transition; indeed, a desire to avoid importing oil from countries 
viewed as enemies has driven and will continue to drive much of our 
fuel extraction policy.76 
                                                        
 71.  See An Unconventional Bonanza, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2012, at 1 (“Only one-third of 
all gas is traded across borders, compared with two-thirds of oil.  Other commodities fetch 
roughly the same price the world over, but gas has no global price.”). 
 72.  See id. at 11–13 (discussing the barriers to liquefied natural gas but predicting a 
gradual internationalization of the natural gas market). 
 73.  See OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NORTH 
AMERICAN LNG IMPORT/EXPORT TERMINALS, PROPOSED/POTENTIAL (2012), available at 
http://ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/LNG-proposed-potential.pdf. 
 74.  The transmission grid in the United States, for example, is highly interconnected 
with Canada, but the lines are artificially separated at the border by a transformer, and 
Canada maintains jurisdiction over its lines.  ABRAHAM, supra note 62, at 20. 
 75.  See, e.g., About NERC, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/page. 
php?cid=1 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (“NERC is a self-regulatory organization, subject to 
oversight by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and governmental authori-
ties in Canada.”). 
 76.  See, e.g., Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 
Stat. 1492 (2007) (aiming to “move the United States toward greater energy independence 
and security” by increasing alternative fuel use and implementing energy reduction goals 
in federal buildings, among other measures). 
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Just as international forces increasingly affect U.S. energy mar-
kets (and vice versa), our internal economic treatment of energy sys-
tems also has changed substantially in the past two decades.  Tradi-
tionally, in the United States, almost all pieces of the physical energy 
system were regarded as natural monopolies,77 with significant conse-
quences for the regulatory system discussed in Part II.C.  Over time, 
this view has evolved.  Restructuring of electricity regulation and oth-
er energy markets to allow for more competition, also known as de-
regulation, was popular in the 1990s but has slowed somewhat since 
the Enron crisis.78  Even prior to the heavy restructuring trend in the 
1990s, the federal government recognized that fuel extraction is a 
classically competitive enterprise and thus deregulated prices of natu-
ral gas at the wellhead—meaning the price of natural gas sold from a 
producer (the entity that extracts the gas) to a buyer.79  The federal 
government and some states also began to view components of the 
electricity system—particularly generation—as competitive and start-
                                                        
 77.  Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regulation, in THE 
END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC 
POWER INDUSTRY 43, 46–57 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003) (describing 
Samuel Insull’s successful campaign for state electricity regulation of utilities as natural 
monopolies and how most states had established public utility commissions and natural 
monopoly treatment by the 1930s and 40s). 
 78.  See WILLIAM W. HOGAN, CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN REGULATED INDUS., ELECTRICITY 
MARKET RESTRUCTURING: REFORMS OF REFORMS, 20TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 3–9 (2001), 
available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/rut052501.pdf (describing U.S. re-
structuring and its motivations); Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Por-
tents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 172–75, 186 (2001) (describing the rise of deregula-
tion, including in California, and concluding that “the California experience may 
significantly slow the onward march of electricity deregulation in other parts of the coun-
try”); Alexia Brunet & Meredith Shafe, Beyond Enron: Regulation in Energy Derivatives Trad-
ing, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 665, 682–93 (2007) (describing post-Enron changes in ener-
gy markets and regulation); Electricity Restructuring by States, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (2010), 
http://205.254.135.7/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (show-
ing several states, in yellow, that have suspended restructuring). 
 79.  See Suedeen G. Kelly, Natural Gas, in ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 8–23 (Energy Law Group eds., 2000) (discussing the passage of the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978, which provided for the phasing out of the regulation of natural gas 
sales from producers to pipelines and other entities, and the Natural Gas Wellhead Decon-
trol Act of 1986, which eventually removed all price controls on production). 
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ed separating generation from transmission and distribution.80  Fol-
lowing this separation, small, independent entities began to compete 
to generate electricity.81  Some components of the system that involve 
major infrastructure investment, like transmission lines or pipelines, 
remain as classic natural monopolies, however; it is not generally prof-
itable for more than one company to make that investment in a par-
ticular area,82 and the infrastructure could become a problematic bot-
tleneck if not regulated.83 
These overall dynamics play out in varying ways at each stage of 
the energy production process.  Although historical and current en-
ergy subsidies and regulatory intervention make separating market 
forces from governance difficult,84 the core economic drivers in elec-
tricity include the type of fuel used by generators,85 the quantity and 
                                                        
 80.  See Sandeep Vaheesan, Preempting Parochialism and Protectionism in Power, 49 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 87, 94 (2012) (explaining that “in a significant fraction of states, only trans-
mission and distribution are treated as natural monopolies; generation and retailing are 
open to competition” (footnote omitted)). 
 81.  See Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal Energy 
Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 642–43 (2009) (noting nonutility companies entering the 
power generation market). 
 82.  See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 765, 772 (2008) (“Delivery—transmission and distribution service—is a natural mo-
nopoly because the construction of duplicate delivery networks between two points is often 
inefficient.”). 
 83.  See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted?: The Effect of the Rise and 
Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 13 (2004) (explaining that 
transmission “wires are the equivalent of a gas pipeline—an essential network industry that 
is often a natural monopoly.  Unless rate-regulated, a bottleneck industry can extract mo-
nopoly rents from generators and end users who must use the transmission service to move 
electricity to market.”). 
 84.  See, e.g., CONG. QUARTERLY INC., ENERGY POLICY 66–67 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing 
congressional requirements in the 1970s and early 80s that power plants use coal instead 
of natural gas). 
 85.  STAN KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34746, POWER PLANTS: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND COSTS 1 (2008) (identifying “construction costs, fuel expense, envi-
ronmental regulations, and financing costs” as the “factors that determine the cost of elec-
tricity from new power plants”); cf., Davis, supra note 29, at 58–59 (explaining that unlike 
in fossil fuel-generated power plants, the price of fuel does not drive the cost of nuclear 
power significantly but that the price of fossil fuels, which still are required for a nuclear 
plant, affects cost). 
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timing of electricity production,86 and the ultimate destination of 
generated electricity.  These forces, which have recently been shaped 
by demands for an updated grid,87 cleaner fuels,88 and consumer con-
trol of electricity consumption and price,89 strongly influence the pace 
of energy transformation. 
                                                        
 86.  See, e.g., Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
903, 958 (2011) (describing “peaker” power plants, which are “older plants that can be 
dispatched at relatively short notice but have such high operational costs that they are not 
profitable other than at peak demand, when wholesale prices are highest”). 
 87.  See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., THE CASE FOR A 21ST CENTURY ELECTRICITY 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM (2009), available at http://dpc.senate.gov/dpcdoc.cfm?doc_name= 
fs-111-1-34 (arguing that “[t]he electricity transmission grid in the United States is region-
ally fragmented, inadequate, and does not offer the state-of-the-art transmission system 
that is needed to access the country’s best renewable energy resources”); Charles Cate, 
Southwest Power Pool, Integrated Transmission Planning Process, FERC Technical Con-
ference (March 19–21, 2012,), http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/201204101125 
57-spp.pdf (explaining that more transmission is needed to improve grid reliability, add 
renewables to the grid, allow for diverse fuel usage for reliability, create more efficient 
electricity delivery, and reduce the need for new generation, among other factors). 
 88.  See, e.g., Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Oct. 2012) [hereinafter RPS Policies], http://dsireusa.org/ 
documents/summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf (showing 29 states, the District of Columbia, and 
two territories as having renewable portfolio standards, which require a certain portion of 
electricity to come from renewable sources). 
 89.  See, e.g., An Introduction to ELCON, ELEC. CONSUMERS RES. COUNCIL, 
http://www.elcon.org/ (last visited July 11, 2012) (explaining that the council represents 
the views of industrial electricity consumers before FERC and within NERC); Charles H. 
Koch, Jr., Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 589, 602 (2005) (observing that “[l]arge consumers have enough economic power to 
create alternatives, even when their local utility has some degree of market power,” and 
that they often align with utilities to influence political decisions, but arguing that small 
industrial and residential consumers have lost political power with electricity restructur-
ing).  In the many states that remain regulated, however, the mandate that public service 
and public utility commission only approve “reasonable” rates can give consumers a pow-
erful voice in major decisions about power plant construction, fuel choice, and other elec-
tricity-based issues.  Megan J. Hertzler & Mara N. Koeller, Who Pays for Carbon Costs?  Uncer-
tainty and Risk in Response to the Current Patchwork of Carbon Regulation for Public Utilities, 36 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 904, 931 (2010) (explaining that “rates for service are set through a 
quasi-legislative process involving review by state regulatory commissions acting under 
broad powers conferred by the state legislature to determine just and reasonable rates 
through an examination of the public utility’s costs”). 
 796 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:773 
At the electricity generation stage, the fuel chosen by generators 
is a choice with powerful environmental and social effects90 that drives 
decisions about the location and capacity of transmission or fuel 
transportation infrastructure, and it is largely a function of available 
extraction technologies.  A booming natural gas supply enabled by 
recently expanded horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing tech-
nologies, for example, has caused gas prices to drop91 and has led 
many existing power generators to switch to gas.  Indeed, most new 
generating capacity built in the United States is natural gas-fired.92  
This trend, in turn, creates incentives against constructing more ex-
pensive renewable generating capacity—thus partially slowing what 
appeared to be a rapid yet small energy transition toward renewa-
bles.93 
                                                        
 90.  See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 63–64, 75–76 (2012) (describing acid rain caused by coal-
fired power plants and the contribution of these same plants to greenhouse gas emissions 
and co-pollutants, explaining that power plants “emit half of the nation’s mercury emis-
sions,” noting the health and economic impacts of pollution, with respect to co-pollutants 
from coal, noting that the level of emissions depends in part on the type of coal burned, 
and observing that “choices among renewable energy technologies will impact net co-
pollutant levels”). 
 91.  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AVERAGE PRICE OF NATURAL GAS SOLD TO ELECTRIC POWER 
CONSUMERS, BY STATE, 2010–2012 (Oct. 2012), available at http://205.254.135.7/natural 
gas/monthly/pdf/table_23.pdf.  In January 2010, the average price of natural gas sold to 
power plants was $6.98 per thousand cubic feet of gas.  Id.  By January 2011, this had 
dropped to $5.66 and to $3.81 by January 2012.  Id. 
 92.  See supra note 45. 
 93.  So far, evidence of gas outcompeting potential renewable projects has been anec-
dotal, but an MIT source predicts massive displacement of new renewables by gas plants.  
SERGEY PALTSEV ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH. PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND POLICY OF 
GLOBAL CHANGE, REPORT NO. 186, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION, USE, 
AND TRADE 13–15 (2010), available at http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MIT 
JPSPGC_Rpt186.pdf.  Several concerns also have prevented a broader transition from coal 
to gas in the electricity world.  Power plants have historically experienced broad price vola-
tility in natural gas and are worried about continued price fluctuations.  Id. at 30–31.  
Cheap, abundant coal, in contrast, has offered a more steady and predictable fuel option.  
Id. at 20–21.  Even if natural gas prices remained consistently low and encouraged genera-
tors to switch to gas, this trend could disincentivize expanded gas extraction; hydraulic 
fracturing is an expensive extraction technology, and energy companies might avoid drill-
ing and fracturing new wells if they believe that the break-even price is elusive.  Id. at 6–10. 
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Several forces impede any type of generator commitment to a 
new fuel, whether natural gas, renewables, or other sources.  In the 
case of natural gas, for example, generators sometimes enter into 
long-term contracts for fuel supply with an energy marketer, largely 
for price-hedging purposes.94  The energy marketer, in turn, works 
with individual gas producers and contracts with pipelines to 
transport the gas to utility clients.95  Long-term contracts can disincen-
tivize switches to new fuels or generating plants, particularly more ex-
pensive ones.  Similar entrenchment within the energy system extends 
beyond fuel supply to the utility that buys wholesale power and sells 
this power retail to customers.  Utilities sometimes sign power pur-
chase agreements with generators, ensuring that generators have a re-
liable outlet for their product and that utilities have a steady supply of 
electricity at a predictable price.96  If utility customers demand new 
generators with access to more alternative fuel sources, long-term 
                                                        
 94.  Judith M. Matlock, Impact of Restructuring of the Electric Power Industry on Oil, Gas, 
Coal, and Other Mineral Producers, ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. § 1.16[2] (43rd ed. 1997) 
(describing the stranded costs that can result from long-term fuel contracts).  But see id. 
§ 1.16[1] (noting that “[a]s utilities face competition in the generation segment of their 
business, this is expected to reduce the demand for long-term fuel contracts”). 
 95.  See, e.g., SOUTHWEST ENERGY, http://www.southwest-energy.com (last visited Nov. 
4, 2012) (explaining that Southwest Energy, a midstream marketer, specializes in “supply 
aggregation, sales, and logistical delivery”); see also JAMES HICKEY, JR. ET AL., ENERGY LAW 
AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000) (describing gas marketing). 
 96.  Detton, supra note 64, at 5-5 (explaining that “some physical contracts charge a 
price for the seller’s commitment to reserve capacity, regardless of whether the buyer ac-
tually takes the electricity, as well as a separate price for the electricity actually received,” 
that some are “firm, meaning that only certain forces outside a party’s control may justify 
interruption of receipt or delivery,” and that “[t]he price may be fixed to lock in current 
market prices to reduce price risk in the future,” although “[t]ransaction agreements for 
longer terms . . . may use a wider variety of pricing terms”).  Long-term contracts in some 
cases may benefit renewable producers in the future, as renewable generators typically 
“lock in” deals through these contracts.  David A. Domansky, The Indefatigable Power of 
Wind: A Practical Treatment of Development of Wind Projects, 55 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. FDN. 
INST. § 5-1 (2009) (noting that “in a typical wind project . . . the power purchaser . . . pur-
chases the [p]roject’s output pursuant to a long-term Power Purchase Agreement”); see 
also Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade (Or Is It Three?): Developing the Capacity in Gov-
ernment Necessary to Reduce Carbon Emissions and Administer Energy Markets, 88 OR. L. REV. 
405, 476–77 (2009) (noting that large industrial consumers sometimes bypass utilities and 
directly enter into power purchase agreements with generators). 
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agreements may constrain the utility’s ability to switch.97  Also, state-
based ratemaking regimes for retail electricity constrain this ability 
because reasonable rate standards are required,98 thus limiting utili-
ties’ use of relatively more expensive alternative fuels. 
Market forces in the transmission sector have similarly powerful 
effects within the energy system as a whole.  As noted above, transmis-
sion lines are a classic natural monopoly, and many utilities that own 
transmission lines also own generation capacity.99  Rather than raising 
prices, they could simply block all other generators from using the 
lines or charge exorbitant fees.  While a number of regulations have 
emerged to temper these effects, the entrenched transmission regime 
remains a powerful bottleneck and a potential blockade to desired 
changes in the energy system.100  Utilities can still deny generators ac-
cess to the grid if generation will be too intermittent and will interfere 
with effective grid operation.101  Line connections also can be delayed 
by the long queue of generators awaiting interconnection.102 
                                                        
 97.  See, e.g., Jonathan A. Lesser, The Used and Useful Test: Implications for a Restructured 
Electric Industry, 23 ENERGY L.J. 349, 349 (2002) (describing how “[i]n 1987, a group of 
nine Vermont utilities . . . entered into a thirty-year contract, from 1990 to 2020, for pow-
er” from a hydroelectric generator). 
 98.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 56–235.2 (2012) (explaining the “just and reasonable” 
rate requirement for public utilities in Virginia). 
 99.  See Vaheesan, supra note 80, at 94 (noting that “[i]n much of the West and South-
east, most utilities remain vertically integrated and regulated as natural monopolies,” alt-
hough recognizing that new generating firms can enter the market and sell to these utili-
ties). 
 100.  Cf. id. at 115 (noting that “incumbent utilities with significant political clout in 
state government can use siting processes to block new transmission lines as a means to 
protect their existing market power”). 
 101.  See, e.g., R. BRENT ALDERFER ET AL., MAKING CONNECTIONS: CASE STUDIES OF 
INTERCONNECTION BARRIERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON DISTRIBUTED POWER PROJECTS 37 
(Natl. Renewable Energy Lab., Paper NREL/SR-200-28053, 2000), available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy00osti/28053.pdf (“There were several case-study examples 
of distributed power proponents being denied interconnection and parallel operation by 
either investor owned or publicly owned utilities.”).  But see infra text accompanying note 
136 (describing uniform interconnection standards). 
 102.  See Stephen M. Fisher, Note, Reforming Interconnection Queue Management Under 
FERC Order No. 2003, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 119 (2009) (observing that many regional 
interconnection queues “are backlogged with hundreds of power projects, representing 
tens of thousands of megawatts of generating capacity” and that projects are sometimes 
backlogged “several months” due to the wait). 
 2013] DYNAMIC ENERGY FEDERALISM 799 
New generators—particularly renewable installations located far 
from load centers—also need new lines, and they often rely on utili-
ties to build them.  However, beyond controlling access to existing 
lines, utilities can also refuse to construct new ones.103  Although 
“merchant” transmission lines constructed by non-vertically integrated 
utilities are slowly emerging, the large utilities still hold the bulk of 
the capital and expertise necessary to construct new transmission.104  
Existing regulations, too, favor construction by existing utilities.105  Yet 
vertically integrated utilities with their own generation capacity have 
few incentives to build new transmission that will accommodate new, 
competitive generation.106 
Finally, even utilities willing to build new lines face a dilemma: 
They want up-front assurances that generators will in fact construct 
new capacity and connect it to the line, yet generators are unwilling to 
build until they have a reasonable guarantee of grid access.  Texas has 
solved this problem by designating “competitive renewable energy 
zones” where construction of new wind generation is anticipated and 
by requiring rapid construction of transmission to these zones.107  Cal-
ifornia has also implemented a similar system.108  The western states, 
in turn, have joined in an attempt to designate regional renewable 
zones and encourage construction of transmission to them,109 but the 
                                                        
 103.  See Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting 
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (“After the FERC issued Order 888, which man-
dated open access to transmission lines, investment in new bulk transmission facilities 
dropped by nearly 50%.” (footnote omitted)). 
 104.  See id. (noting “entry-deterring practices” by utilities against merchant transmis-
sion). 
 105.  See, e.g., Ashley Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu, 81 
U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 720 (2010) (explaining that “in Colorado, it is not clear that anyone 
other than a public utility may apply to site a transmission line, although a public utility is 
defined broadly so that any party operating transmission lines may be a public utility”); see 
also Alexandra Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013) (describing var-
ied policies regarding eminent domain authority for transmission lines). 
 106.  See supra text accompanying note 100. 
 107.  Tex. Pub. Utility Comm’n Order 33672 (2008); PUCT—CREZ Home Page, PUB. 
UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.texascrezprojects.com/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
 108.  Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy. 
ca.gov/reti/index.html. 
 109.  See W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & DEP’T OF ENERGY, WESTERN RENEWABLE ENERGY 
ZONES—PHASE 1 REPORT 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/ 
WREZ09.pdf (describing Western Renewable Energy Zones). 
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Western Governors’ Association’s lack of regional authority over 
transmission siting may stifle serious investment in generation or 
transmission.110 
Finally, at the distribution level, where a utility provides electrici-
ty to individual consumers or a marketer connects consumers directly 
to generators, a number of market forces affect the types of energy 
generated and consumer access to it.  Historically, vertically integrat-
ed utilities charged customers fixed, regulated rates for electricity.111  
In exchange for offering rates controlled by the state’s public utility 
or public service commission, utilities enjoyed a natural monopoly in 
a given service area.112  Consumers had no choice but to buy electricity 
from these entities.113  Consumers also had few means of reducing 
costs by using electricity at efficient times.114  Fixed rates, the utility’s 
natural monopoly in an area, and the inability to easily move con-
sumption away from peak periods gave consumers few incentives to 
change consumption habits or locate alternative generators. 
Technological change, the demand for cleaner sources, and the 
increasing economic viability of renewables have slowly changed utili-
ty and consumer behavior and have enabled some movement toward 
the type of energy system that would meet a variety of public values, 
such as affordable and clean energy.  Some consumers have begun to 
demand options for purchasing electricity generated from wind or so-
lar sources, for example,115 or for real time pricing, in which electricity 
                                                        
 110.  For a thorough discussion of the problems associated with the lack of regional or 
federal authority over transmission siting authority, see Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth 
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 
VANDERBILT L. REV. 1801 (2012). 
 111.  Spence, supra note 82, at 769. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 770, 772 (explaining that distribution is a natural monopoly and historically 
was provided by vertically integrated utilities and regulated as a natural monopoly). 
 114.  Cf. Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network Architecture, 
Information Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 833, 871 (2010) 
(describing real-time prices and other measures that would reduce customer use of elec-
tricity and utilities’ disincentives to implement these types of schemes). 
 115.  See, e.g., PG&E Proposes Option for Customers to Choose 100% Renewable Energy, N. AM. 
WINDPOWER (Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter PG&E Proposes 100% Renewable Energy], 
http://www.nawindpower.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.9747 (de-
scribing Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s proposed wind and solar energy certificate 
program). 
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prices change depending on how many people are demanding it at a 
given time.116  State legislatures and public utility and service commis-
sions, in turn, have begun to enable these types of options.117  Old 
traditions remain, however; certain lingering long-term contracts, the 
powerful incentives for utilities to block transmission access, and con-
sumers’ lack of familiarity with more flexible usage and pricing 
schemes for electricity largely perpetuate an antiquated and en-
trenched system.  These long-standing, hard-to-change aspects of 
markets provide significant barriers to efforts at framing regulation 
and institutions to support needed evolution. 
C.  Regulatory 
The combination of physical and market challenges highlighted 
in Parts I.A and I.B combine to create daunting regulatory challenges 
in an energy system that needs more flexibility in generation and ac-
cess to transmission, more consumer options, and, as always, a con-
tinuous and adequate supply of electricity.  These challenges largely 
fall to federal and local entities, which often are not fully equipped 
with the jurisdictional reach or the governance capacity to fully ad-
dress them.  Although energy resources are distributed unequally 
around the world, and markets for them are increasingly transnation-
al, these resources are primarily regulated at a national or subnational 
level due to the international law principle of state sovereignty over 
natural resources.  This principle both gives the United States proper-
ty rights to and control over its land-based and offshore energy re-
sources, and makes it dependent on the other countries with energy 
resources that it needs.118 
                                                        
 116.  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions: Real-Time Pricing, GALVIN ELEC. INITIATIVE, 
http://www.galvinpower.org/power-consumers/act/real-time-illinois/faq (last visited Jan. 
14, 2013) (“[R]eal-time pricing gives consumers information about the actual cost of elec-
tricity at any given time [and] lets consumers adjust their electricity usage . . . for example, 
scheduling usage during periods of low demand to pay cheaper rates.”). 
 117.  See, e.g., PG&E Proposes 100% Renewable Energy, supra note 115; see also RPS Policies, 
supra note 88 (showing renewable portfolio standards and goals for various states and ter-
ritories). 
 118.  See Robert Dufresne, The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, and Inter-
national Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 331, 350–56 (2004); Melaku Geboye Desta, OPEC 
Production Management Practices Under WTO Law and the Antitrust Law of Non-OPEC Countries, 
28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 439, 453–55 (2010); cf. GEORGE ELIAN, THE PRINCIPLE 
OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES (1979); NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER 
NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES (1997); Hari M. Osofsky, Learning 
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Within the United States, a number of local, regional, federal, 
and state regulations, standards, and quasi-formal governance 
schemes shape the physical structure of America’s energy system and 
intervene in the market forces described above.  These public con-
trols also provide unique market opportunities, such as the construc-
tion of new transmission lines and the addition of smart grid technol-
ogies, which can enable new generation sources to connect to the 
grid and empower consumers to influence the type, quantity, and 
price of electricity they consume.119 
Local and state governments have broad control over the choice 
of fuel used to produce electricity and the type of generation facilities 
constructed.  For example, a growing number of cities and states have 
required a certain percentage of electricity to come from renewable 
                                                        
from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 71 (2005); Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of 
Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1283 n.261 
(2008). 
 119.  Multi-level public-private collaborations, such as those in the new greenhouse gas 
emissions standards for motor vehicles, similarly shape the evolving transportation side of 
the energy sector.  Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons 
from the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343 (2011); Hari Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism 
and Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237 (2011) 
[hereinafter Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism].  The government also subsidizes desired trans-
formative developments at times, such as providing royalties concessions to oil companies 
engaged in offshore drilling; these incentives impact the type, rate, and location of prima-
ry fuel extraction for transportation and heating, for example, as well as for electricity 
generation.  Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(a)(1) & (a)(3)(C) (2006).  The Fifth Circuit has upheld this scheme.  Kerr-McGee 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior, 554 F.3d 1082, 1086–87 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Keith 
B. Hall, Mineral Law: Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act, 57 LA. B.J. 53 
(2009).  For criticism and limited reform of the royalty scheme, see U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-682T, ROYALTIES COLLECTION: ONGOING PROBLEMS 
WITH INTERIOR’S EFFORTS TO ENSURE A FAIR RETURN FOR TAXPAYERS REQUIRE ATTENTION 
7–8 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07682t.pdf; DEP’T OF INTERIOR, 
REFORMING MMS: JANUARY 2009–PRESENT (2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/ 
deepwaterhorizon/upload/05-07-10-reform-fact-sheet.pdf.  Given this Article’s emphasis 
on the electricity sector and the above-described previous scholarly analysis of multi-scalar 
dynamics in regulating the transportation sector, however, this Section focuses primarily 
on the electricity context. 
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sources.120  These requirements force utilities, over time, to change 
generation sources even if they have to abandon beneficial long-term 
contracts with fossil fuel-based generators.121  Local and state govern-
ments also affect the type of generation chosen through their regula-
tion of utility rates or through direct mandates for generation.  City 
councils sometimes direct municipally owned utilities, for example, to 
build new renewable generation,122 whereas states that regulate utility 
rates tend to only approve affordable construction projects that keep 
rates down.123  Through renewable portfolio standards and other deci-
sions about the energy generation mix, state and local governments 
directly or indirectly require the construction of new transmission to 
connect renewable generation to the utilities that must purchase it.  
Texas has gone the furthest in this regard, requiring its Public Utility 
Commission to select utilities to build high-priority transmission lines 
to wind generation built under the state’s renewable portfolio stand-
ard.124 
Federal entities also influence generation choice by governing 
core elements of the transportation of fuels and electricity.  For ex-
ample, FERC approves the location of interstate gas pipelines and has 
                                                        
 120.  For a description of city initiatives for renewables in the most populous areas, see 
Garrick Pursley & Hannah Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 959, Table 1 (2011). 
 121.  Governments often mitigate the impacts of abandoning long-term contracts by 
allowing utilities to recover their stranded costs, or at least a portion of these costs, 
through the rates that they charge.  See, e.g., William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded 
Costs, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 848 (1995) (arguing in favor of allowing recovery 
and describing FERC’s ruling allowing recovery of stranded costs but requiring utilities to 
mitigate their stranded investment obligation). 
 122.  See supra note 120. 
 123.  See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald & Tom Zeller, Jr., Cost of Tapping Green Power Makes Pro-
jects a Tougher Sell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, at A1 (describing how state regulators rejected 
a Virginia utility’s contract to purchase power from a wind farm, “citing the recession and 
the lower prices of natural gas and other fossil fuels”). 
 124.  S.B. 20 § 3(g)(2), 79th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2005), available at 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/791/billtext/pdf/SB00020F.pdf.  On the transpor-
tation side, which is not the focus of this Article, cities make decisions regarding their own 
vehicle fleet and land use planning that shape both the choice of and overall usage pat-
terns regarding transportation fuels.  See Hari M. Osofsky, Suburban Climate Change Efforts: 
Possibilities for Small and Nimble Cities Participating in State, Regional, National, and Internation-
al Networks, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2013); Katherine A. Trisolini, All 
Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 744–45 (2010). 
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jurisdiction over wholesale gas prices (typically now tied to market 
rates) and the price charged by pipelines for transporting natural 
gas.125  This federal regulation affects power plants’ access to an in-
creasingly sought-after fuel source.  FERC also influences the ability of 
renewable generators to sell their product due to its control over 
transmission services, including the rate that operators may charge for 
these services, the means of allocating rates, and the conditions that 
they may impose on generators waiting to connect to the grid.126 
In 1996, FERC ordered that vertically integrated utilities func-
tionally separate their transmission services from distribution and 
generation and offer open access to their transmission lines on a first-
come, first-served basis.127  When this failed to solve the transmission 
bottleneck, FERC attempted to require the regionalization of trans-
mission.  To do this, it strongly encouraged the formation of organi-
zations with regional control of the transmission grid—originally 
called independent system operators (“ISOs”) and later regional 
transmission organizations (“RTOs”),128 entities that Hybrid Energy Gov-
ernance discusses in more depth.129  These organizations, where they 
have been formed, apply to FERC for a unified transmission “tariff”—
a document that sets the rate that the organization may charge for 
transmission service and prescribes the conditions of that service.130  
Regional transmission organizations then operate the transmission 
grid and plan for necessary upgrades.131  In one of their most conten-
tious roles, they plan for new transmission capacity and decide how to 
                                                        
 125.  See Natural Gas, Commission’s Responsibilities, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N 
[hereinafter Natural Gas, FERC], http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas.asp (last visited Feb. 
17, 2013) (describing FERC’s responsibilities and procedures for regulating the construc-
tion of pipelines and establishing rates for pipeline service).  This power originally comes 
from 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2006) (enacted 1938) (granting federal authority over “transporta-
tion of natural gas in interstate commerce” and “the sale in interstate commerce of natural 
gas for resale”). 
 126.  Cf. Natural Gas, FERC, supra note 125. 
 127.  FERC Order No. 888 (Final Rule, issued Apr. 24, 1996), available at 
www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm95-8-00w.txt. 
 128.  See id. at 52. (encouraging ISOs); FERC Order No. 2000, at 1, 70–72 (Final Rule, 
issued Dec. 20, 1999), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/trans-
plan.asp (encouraging RTOs). 
 129.  See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17. 
 130.  FERC Order No. 888, supra note 127, at 4. 
 131.  FERC Order No. 2000, supra note 128, at 323–24. 
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allocate transmission rates among utilities to cover this new capaci-
ty132—leading the Seventh Circuit to strike down one scheme133 and 
FERC to update its standards for RTO cost recovery.134 
Beyond setting rates and service standards for RTOs and other 
transmission operators, FERC also determines interconnection re-
quirements, including how operators must prioritize and review gen-
erators’ requests to connect to the lines and the conditions that they 
may impose on newly interconnected sources.135  FERC has written 
specific interconnection standards for large wind generators in an ef-
fort to open up transmission access for this growing source yet also 
ensure reliable grid operation.136 
Although FERC affects generation choices through its control 
over pipelines and transmission services, states and local governments 
have an equally strong role in electricity transportation decisions.  
Municipal or state governments generally control transmission-siting 
processes and can block projects by refusing proposed locations.137  A 
small number of regional organizations have emerged to facilitate 
transmission siting and planning for future expansions,138 but local 
entities have been hesitant to cede meaningful authority to them.139 
States also have unique authority over the electricity sold by a 
utility directly to consumers.  Historically, states granted utilities ex-
                                                        
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
 134.  See FERC Order No. 1000-B (Order on Rehearing and Clarification, issued Oct. 
18, 2012), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/trans-plan.asp 
(updating RTO planning and cost allocation requirements). 
 135.  See, e.g., FERC Order No. 2003-C (Order on Rehearing, issued June 16, 2005), 
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/order2003.asp (providing 
interconnection standards for large generators). 
 136.  FERC Order No. 661-A (Order on Rehearing and Clarification, issued Dec. 12, 
2005), available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20051212171744-RM05-4-
001.pdf. 
 137.  For a description of siting regimes in some of the western states, see Brown & Ros-
si, supra note 105, at 713–19. 
 138.  See Klass & Wilson, supra note 110, at 1867–69 (discussing regional siting agen-
cies). 
 139.  See id. at 740, 748 (describing how many state transmission siting regimes remain 
antiquated and focus on local issues such as local environmental impacts, and describing 
cost allocation as a major impediment to regional transmission governance and planning). 
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clusive access to service territories in exchange for comprehensive 
regulation.140  States set the rates that utilities could charge customers, 
limited utilities’ ability to immediately disconnect service for custom-
ers who could not pay, and regulated a variety of other aspects of ser-
vice, such as billing disclosure.141  States also controlled the types of 
generation built by utilities and the types of electricity purchased 
from generators.  This system remains in place in a number of areas, 
but restructuring in a handful of states has substantially changed it.142 
In Texas, for example, in regions where sufficient competition 
among generators has developed, the state has separated the genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution functions.143  This separation al-
lows it to introduce competition in generation—and to some extent 
in distribution—while maintaining monopoly treatment of transmis-
sion.  Power generation companies now compete for customers, and 
retail electric providers (“REPs”) offer an interface between custom-
ers and generators.144  Retail electric providers approach customers 
with a variety of generation packages and arrange for a transmission 
and distribution service provider to connect the generator to the re-
tail customer.145  The state continues to at least minimally regulate 
each of these entities: Power generation companies must apply for a 
license, for example, and retail electric providers must provide certain 
notice to customers and, like historic vertically integrated utilities, 
providers must follow certain procedures in connecting and discon-
necting customers from power services.146  In contrast, transmission 
and the portion of the distribution market covered by distribution 
                                                        
 140.  Bradley, supra note 77. 
 141.  Spence, supra note 82, at 769 & n.22. 
 142.  See WARWICK, supra note 53, at 6.1–6.5 & fig.6.2 (describing utility restructuring). 
 143.  SUSAN COMBS, TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, WINDOW ON STATE 
GOVERNMENT: ENERGY REPORT—ELECTRICITY, available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/ 
specialrpt/energy/uses/electricity.php (last visited Dec. 16, 2012). 
 144.  See Retail Electric Providers, TEX. ELEC. CHOICE EDUC. PROGRAM, http://powerto 
choose.org/_content/_compare/companylist.aspx (last visited July 11, 2012) (describing 
REP functions). 
 145.  Power to Choose: Electricity Basics, TEX. ELEC. CHOICE EDUC. PROGRAM, http://power 
tochoose.org/_content/_about/electricity_basics.asp (last visited Dec. 16, 2012). 
 146.  See Certification and Licensing, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.puc.state.tx. 
us/industry/electric/business/rep/Rep.aspx (last visited July 11, 2012) (describing re-
sponsibilities and certification and licensing procedures for retail electric providers). 
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service providers, both of which Texas still views as having a natural 
monopoly, still operate under state-approved rates.147 
Together, the physical, market, and regulatory elements of the 
U.S. secondary energy system form a complex system.  Any efforts to 
change the system or improve its governance must navigate the nu-
ances of this tripartite structure.  As discussed in the Part that follows, 
the nature of this system creates complicated federalism dynamics 
among and within levels of governance as multiple entities are grant-
ed partial authority over critical decisions. 
II.  THE NEED FOR A DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF ENERGY FEDERALISM 
As the analysis in Part I illustrates, the regulatory apparatus ap-
plicable to the U.S. energy system is tremendously complex, with 
many different types of laws, institutions, and actors operating at mul-
tiple levels of government.  The problem of multi-level governance is 
not new and has long been addressed in the United States under the 
rubric of “federalism.”  From before the founding of this country 
through the present, both scholars and policymakers have debated 
the best way to organize regulatory authority across multiple levels of 
government.  The vast majority of this scholarship focuses on “scale 
matching”: people argue over which level of government, usually state 
or federal, is best suited to address a particular issue.  Energy law 
scholarship has followed this tradition for the most part, with many 
articles devoted to examining which level of government is most ap-
propriate for a particular sub-part of energy law, such as transmission 
siting148 or renewable portfolio standards.149 
While respecting the contribution that the current energy law 
scholarship makes to particular federalism questions, this Part argues 
that a more dynamic and holistic model is needed.  In numerous sub-
stantive areas, especially environmental law, there has been increasing 
scholarly analysis of federalism in dynamic terms, which helps connect 
federalism to broader governance concerns.150  Very little of this dy-
namic federalism literature, however, has infused analyses of energy 
federalism.  This Part proposes a model for doing so. 
                                                        
 147.  Transmission and Distribution Providers, ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/services/rq 
/tdsp/ (last visited July 31, 2012). 
 148.  See infra note 152. 
 149.  See infra note 151. 
 150.  For a discussion of this development, see Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of 
Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 159–61 (2006). 
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set individual, and highly varied, standards and goals.151  Other schol-
arship similarly discusses how effective and appropriate an expansion 
of federal transmission siting authority would be.152 
With these rather narrow applications of federalism to energy, 
and a tendency to rely on traditional federalism principles within 
these applications, energy law has largely failed to incorporate a more 
dynamic version of federalism that is emerging in other substantive 
areas.153  Traditional federalism scholarship focuses on spatial rela-
tionships among levels of governance in a limited way: it concentrates 
on interactions along a vertical axis (the local to the federal), asking 
which level of government is most appropriate and how concurrent 
authority at more than one level of government should be shared.  A 
rapidly developing stream of federalism scholarship, however, has 
moved beyond these static views of multi-level relationships and has 
begun to recognize the complex interactions among governmental 
and nongovernmental actors.  As Hari Osofsky has analyzed in previ-
ous work, a rich scholarly literature in federalism and other areas ex-
plores multiple iterations of regulatory structures that cut across tradi-
tional governance divisions.154 
                                                        
 151.  For example, a 2010 volume of the Connecticut Law Review contained several arti-
cles analyzing the benefits, limitations, and political viability of a national renewable port-
folio standard.  See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davis, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010); Joshua P. Fershee, Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-
Looking Energy Policy Based on a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1405 (2010); Lynn M. Foun-
tain, Johnny-Come-Lately: Practical Considerations of a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1475 
(2010); Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
1425 (2010); David B. Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1451 
(2010). 
 152.  See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 
39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009). 
 153.  We discuss the limited set of scholarship bringing dynamic federalism into energy 
law supra notes 162–170 and accompanying text. 
 154.  Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism, supra note 119 (describing the multi-level public-
private collaborations in the new greenhouse gas emissions standards for motor vehicles).  
As Hari Osofsky has discussed in prior work, dynamic federalism intersects with many oth-
er streams of scholarship in multiple disciplines, such as network theory, scale theory, 
complexity theory, and adaptive management.  Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Govern-
ance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077 (2011) [hereinafter Osof-
sky, BP Oil Spill].  This Article acknowledges those synergies but focuses specifically on dy-
namic federalism to highlight the ways in which those spatial dynamics intersect with 
governance challenges. 
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Specifically, the literature on dynamic federalism’s treatment of 
the vertical axis has moved beyond traditional state-federal questions 
to multi-layered models that integrate actors from the smallest indi-
vidual level to the largest international one.155  “Federalism” for these 
scholars has come to encompass not simply federal-state-local interac-
tions,156 but also simultaneous interactions among multiple govern-
                                                        
 155.  For examples looking at the very small individual and local scales, see Sarah Kra-
koff, Planetary Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
87 (2012); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Car-
bon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1701, 1703 (2008).  For examples of 
discussions that integrate domestic federalism questions with international law, see Robert 
B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination, 
73 MO. L. REV. 1185, 1186–87 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh et. al., When Subnational Meets In-
ternational: The Politics and Place of City, State, and Province in the World, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L. PROC. 339, 340 (2008); Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The 
Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 1–4 (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dia-
lectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 863–71 (2006); Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. 
Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621, 1623–25 (2008); Judith Resnik, Law’s 
Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 
YALE L.J. 1564, 1669–70 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Cli-
mate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 681 (2008); Tseming 
Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 
618 (2009). 
 156.  Robert Percival has traced the emergence of environmental federalism in the 
United States, and some of the traditional debates that took place.  Robert V. Percival, En-
vironmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995).  
For an example of more traditional debates over top-down versus bottom-up models based 
on ideas of “race to the top” versus “race to the bottom theories of regulation, compare 
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bot-
tom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274–79 (1997) (top down), Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Envi-
ronmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 572 (1996) (same), Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Con-
tinuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225, 230–31 (1997) (same); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity 
and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environ-
mental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 69 (1996) (same), with Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. 
Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regula-
tory Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 23, 25–26 (1996) (bottom up); Richard L. Revesz, The Race 
to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 
535–36 (1997) (same); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 
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ance levels along the vertical axis.157  Moreover, as discussed in more 
depth in Part III, dynamic conceptions of shared governance often 
extend well beyond questions of concurrent authority to include 
evolving patterns of complicated relationships.  Federal-state, local-
state, and regional-local relationships often all occur simultaneously 
within one institution and change over time. 
Dynamic federalism also at times moves beyond the primary fo-
cus on the vertical axis that dominates traditional accounts.  Some of 
these scholars include interactions among key actors at a single level 
of governance as part of federalism.  This horizontal dynamic federal-
ism literature brings the role of intra-level regulatory relationships in-
to clearer focus.  For example, Noah Hall has argued that the Great 
Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Compact, which includes eight Great 
Lakes states, uses a cooperative horizontal federalism approach that 
                                                        
1210–12 (1992) (same); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Com-
petitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2040–41 (1993) (same). 
 157.  Kirsten Engel has given a helpful exposition of this evolution in an environmental 
context.  Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 
56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006).  For an earlier exploration of dynamic federalism in a cor-
porate law context, see Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Se-
curities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 109 (2004).  For additional conceptualization of 
dynamic approaches, see ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2012); 
ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 
863, 879–83 (2006); Craig Anthony Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in 
the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 446 (2007); William W. Buzbee, Asymmet-
rical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 
1549–50 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation]; William W. Buzbee, Recogniz-
ing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49–51 (2003) 
[hereinafter Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons]; Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism 
and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering 
States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1328–32 
(2004); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
879, 881 (2008); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Prob-
lems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 66 (2010); Erin 
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011).  For examples of symposia dedicat-
ed to exploring these federalism models, see Symposium, Interactive Federalism: Filling the 
Gaps?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1 (2006); Symposium, The New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decen-
tered World, 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007). 
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promotes flexibility while minimizing incentives to under regulate.158  
In a broader substantive context, Allan Erbsen and others have pro-
vided models for analyzing the way in which horizontal and vertical 
federalism dynamics interact.159 
In addition to analyzing vertical and horizontal relationships 
among government entities in a more nuanced way, the dynamic fed-
eralism literature unpacks existing characterizations of regulatory lev-
els; even when an approach is defined as existing at a particular level, 
such as within the jurisdiction of the federal government, the litera-
ture recognizes that such a characterization may be incomplete, and 
that relationships often shift over time.  For example, Ann Carlson 
has explored the iterative dynamics that move policy forward as the 
state and federal government cooperate and clash over time.160  Erin 
Ryan has considered the role of negotiation in creating these interac-
tions, noting that state and federal officials at times negotiate schemes 
that are “federal” in name only—rejecting a system that would lodge 
all power at one level or another.161  This nuanced treatment of cross-
cutting relationships—those that bridge levels of governance, substan-
tive areas of the law, public/private, or other institutional divisions—
has implications for governance, which Part III explores in more 
depth. 
A few scholars have begun discussing energy law issues in these 
types of dynamic terms, but that scholarship, like the above-described 
more traditional energy federalism work, is all in relatively narrow 
contexts.  Most critically for this Article’s analysis, none of it develops 
an overarching conceptual model for energy federalism.  For exam-
ple, as part of a broader analysis of agency coordination questions in 
administrative law, Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi provide examples of 
interagency coordination tools from energy law.162  Ashira Ostrow has 
developed a dynamic federalism model she terms “process preemp-
                                                        
 158.  Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the 
Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405 (2006). 
 159.  Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008); see also Osofsky, 
Diagonal Federalism, supra note 119. 
 160.  Carlson, supra note 157. 
 161.  See Ryan, supra note 157, at 20 (noting that “[s]ome forms of federalism . . . part-
ner different federal, state, and local actors from across the different branches on both 
sides of the line in an elaborate process with multiple stages of iterative exchange—such as 
negotiated federal lawmaking over policy”). 
 162.  Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1131 (2012). 
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tion” in the context of renewable energy siting.163  In their analysis of 
transmission, Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson also reference the 
dynamic federalism literature, and draw some models from it, includ-
ing Ostrow’s.164  Ann Carlson has argued for a cross-cutting federalism 
approach to energy efficiency standards for appliances modeled on 
the hybrid approach used in the automobile emissions context.165  
Robin Kundis Craig, in turn, has taken a dynamic federalism ap-
proach to exploring the nexus of water, climate change, and energy 
law,166 and Hannah Wiseman has argued for the expansion of regional 
renewable energy governance to address commons and anticommons 
problems in siting.167  With Garrick Pursley, Wiseman also has exam-
ined the possibilities for expanding municipal powers in that con-
text.168  In the fuel extraction context, David Spence has explored the 
need for flexible considerations of federalism in the governance of 
hydraulic fracturing, describing demands for rapid response to new 
risks and assessing the ideal governance levels for this response.169  Fi-
nally, Hari Osofsky has proposed a dynamic federalism model for un-
derstanding the complex regulatory interactions around offshore 
drilling regulation and spill clean-up that occurred in the context of 
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.170 
This Article argues that the complex and evolutionary under-
standing of governance explored in the dynamic federalism scholar-
ship could contribute to a more systematic approach to regulating 
energy than current energy federalism scholarship provides.  A dy-
namic federalism approach is particularly well-suited to energy law 
because of the complex tripartite structure described in Part I.  While 
                                                        
 163.  Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 289, 290 (2011). 
 164.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 110. 
 165.  Ann E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY 
L. 11, 12 (2009). 
 166.  Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Federalism to Climate Change Impacts: Energy Poli-
cy, Food Security, and the Allocation of Water Resources, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 183, 
186–87 (2010). 
 167.  Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 477, 486 (2011). 
 168.  Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 882 
(2011). 
 169.  David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Pro-
duction, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2013). 
 170.  Osofsky, supra note 154, at 1079. 
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detailed analyses of particular areas of energy law are important to 
understanding the nuances of those areas, traditional federalism ap-
proaches focused on solely choosing between the state and federal 
government may not adequately capture crucial dynamics among the 
system’s physical, market, and regulatory aspects. 
Dynamic federalism, with its more complete spatialization of crit-
ical relationships, helps to ensure that this fuller understanding is in-
corporated into regulatory proposals. It also fosters regulatory pro-
posals that consider key stakeholders beyond just the state and federal 
governments and that employ innovative governance methods.  Spe-
cifically, the vertical and horizontal axes of our dynamic federalism 
model for energy—discussed in depth in Part II.B—consider how en-
tities interact across levels of government, within levels of govern-
ment, and simultaneously across and within levels of government.  
Understanding these relationships more systematically across many 
areas of energy law helps to illuminate shared governance challenges 
and possibilities for institutional innovation discussed in Part III and 
the Conclusion. 
B.  Mapping Dynamic Federalism Interactions in the Energy System 
This Section applies the dynamic federalism theory of the previ-
ous Section—a theory that exists largely outside of energy law—by 
mapping the spatial dynamics of energy regulation.  This Section de-
scribes the patterns of relationships that these institutions have across 
different areas of energy law. 
To do so, this Section employs the vertical and horizontal axes 
discussed in Part II.A to trace complex interactions among govern-
mental and nongovernmental actors.  First, it examines vertical rela-
tionships among actors at more than one level of government, includ-
ing both the traditional state-federal interactions and additional 
ones.171  Like other dynamic federalism accounts, it seeks to capture 
the complicated interplay among stakeholders rather than just focus-
ing on state, federal, and concurrent authority.  Second, it explores 
the horizontal dimensions of these relationships, with a discussion of 
the ways in which a variety of actors at each level of government inter-
act in the energy system.172 
In reality, interactions are rarely solely vertical or horizontal.  
Many of this Section’s examples include simultaneous interactions 
                                                        
 171.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 172.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
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across both axes.  For example, when a group of states form a region-
al collaboration, their interaction is horizontal, but they have added a 
new vertical layer in the form of a regional entity.  Breaking out the 
vertical and horizontal elements of the relationships across energy law 
however, helps to illuminate the complicated nature of energy feder-
alism and reveal important patterns, including lessons for the future 
formation of energy institutions and improvement of existing ones.  
Together, these two sets of interacting spatial dynamics frame govern-
ance challenges for the energy system, which are the subject of Part 
III. 
1.  Vertical 
In energy governance, most vertical interactions occur among 
federal-regional, regional-state, and federal-state actors, with a variety 
of actors at each of these levels interacting with many actors at levels 
below or above them.  These actors include: at the national level, 
Congress, FERC, and national associations that report to FERC; at the 
regional level, RTOs/ISOs, entities created by groups of states or their 
public utility commissions (such as state organizations that comment 
on RTO decisions), and federal and state actors operating within 
compacts; at the state level, legislatures, public utility commissions, 
and other state energy and environmental agencies; and at the local 
level, entities that make land use planning decisions and individual 
regulated entities, which at times are city or state-based but often have 
multi-state operations occurring under a larger parent company.173  
We consider activities by utilities and their subunits to be part of “gov-
ernance” because utilities, including privately owned businesses, are 
key actors within several formal governing institutions, such as NERC 
and RTOs/ISOs, and they implement a number of requirements im-
posed by FERC, RTOs/ISOs, and NERC.174  A dynamic approach is 
helpful to exploring these relationships because they change based 
on substantive context and over time. 
Although major federal statutes address different aspects of the 
energy system, they vary significantly in how they balance larger and 
smaller scale authority.  In the context of electricity, state public utility 
commissions and state and local land use bodies largely control most 
                                                        
 173.  See RAP GUIDE, supra note 51, at 9–23 (explaining the structure of the electric in-
dustry and FERC). 
 174.  See, e.g., id. at 67–68 (explaining the rules issued by FERC with which utilities must 
comply). 
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important aspects of generation, transmission, and distribution,175 
with the exception of FERC authority over the terms and rates of 
wholesale transmission service.176  This dominant small-scale control 
can create difficult vertical dynamics.  Ashira Ostrow, for example, has 
explored the ways in which state and local jurisdiction makes renewa-
ble energy siting harder because of communities’ unwillingness to 
bear the burdens of generation, and has drawn from telecommunica-
tions law to argue for a process preemption approach.177  Ashley 
Brown and Jim Rossi, and Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson, have 
explored similar concerns in the context of new transmission lines—
many of which would help bring renewable energy onto the grid—
where FERC and regional transmission organizations have tried to 
address the need for interstate lines that state-by-state public utility 
commission approval often stalls.178  Despite the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 establishing National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors,179 
the Department of Energy has not yet been able to successfully com-
plete such designations due to Ninth and Fourth Circuit rulings,180 
                                                        
 175.  See Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 259 (2011) 
(describing state siting regimes); David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of 
Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 149 (2012) (showing that 
approximately three-quarters of the states still regulate retail electricity (distribution) as a 
natural monopoly). 
 176.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006) (“The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”). 
 177.  Ostrow, supra note 163. 
 178.  Brown & Rossi, supra note 105; Klass & Wilson, supra note 110. 
 179.  16 U.S.C. § 824p(a) (2006). 
 180.  Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d 304, 313 
(4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that although 16 U.S.C. § 216(b)(1)(C)(i) authorizes FERC to 
issue permits when a state has “‘withheld approval for more than 1 year after the filing of 
[a permit] application,’” it “does not give FERC permitting authority when a state has af-
firmatively denied a permit within the one-year deadline.” (alteration in original)); Cali-
fornia Wilderness Coal. v. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2011) (declin-
ing to adopt DOE’s interpretation of section 216, which would only have required notice-
and-comment proceedings to fulfill the “consultation” requirement, and instead conclud-
ing that Congress intended for DOE “to confer with the affected states” before engaging in 
a study that might ultimately result in limitations on the states’ authority). 
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and most key transmission decisions still occur at a state level through 
public utility commissions—and to some extent, at a regional level.181 
In other areas of energy law, however, opposite vertical dynamics 
dominate.  For example, the federal government controls the siting 
and construction of interstate pipelines and all liquefied natural gas 
terminals in the natural gas context,182 wielding substantial authority 
over their size, location, and environmental effects.183  Similarly, 
deepwater drilling and oil spill clean-up are largely governed by fed-
eral statutes and federal inter-agency collaboration, even though they 
involve multiple scales of government.  The Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (“OCSLA”) and Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”), 
building out of the federalism arrangement created in the Sub-
merged Lands Act (“SLA”), designate the federal government as the 
regulator for drilling far off the coast in deepwater.184  The Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (“CERCLA”) and its amendments likewise create the basis for 
the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 
Plan (“NCP”), which governs responses to deepwater spills like the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon one.185 
                                                        
 181.  FERC has at times tried to create institutional mechanisms for addressing these 
issues, such as encouraging the creation of regional transmission organizations in Order 
2000 or mandating that public utilities participate in open and transparent planning pro-
cesses in Order 890.  FERC Order No. 2000, supra note 128, at 3; FERC Order 890, at 3 
(Final Rule, issued Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-
meet/2007/021507/E-1.pdf. 
 182.  See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A) (2006) (prohibiting “the construction or extension 
of any [pipeline] facilities” without a FERC certificate of public convenience and necessi-
ty); 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2006) (“The Commission shall have the exclusive authority to 
approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an 
LNG terminal.”). 
 183.  See, e.g., Guidance for Applicant-Prepared Draft Environmental Assessments for Certain 
Proposed Natural Gas Projects, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, at 1 (April 28, 2011), 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/enviro/draft-ea-guidance.pdf (explaining that FERC 
prepares environmental assessments under the National Environmental Policy Act for “all 
proposed natural gas projects”). 
 184.   See Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–66 (2006); Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–56a (2006); Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1301–15 (2006) (as amended); see also Rachael E. Salcido, Offshore Federalism and Ocean In-
dustrialization, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1355, 1379–82 (2008). 
 185.  40 C.F.R. § 300.2 (2011).  The regulation states: 
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Finally, some energy law establishes hybrid structures in which 
neither federal nor state and local governance dominates.  We analyze 
these structures in depth in Hybrid Energy Governance to assess their ef-
fectiveness in navigating federalism complexity and its resulting gov-
ernance challenges.186  For example, although FERC has federal con-
trol over interstate transmission rates and service, much of the 
operation of transmission lines occurs at the regional level, through 
regional transmission organizations.187  Any transmission utility that 
joins an approved RTO does not have to receive an individual trans-
mission tariff from FERC, which would establish the rate that the utili-
ty could charge and the service conditions that it must follow.188  In-
stead, by becoming a member of the RTO, the utility is immediately 
subject to a complex regional regime and tariff, in which members 
independent of transmission owners and generators set the rules for 
daily grid operations and the electricity market enabled by the grid.189  
                                                        
The NCP is required by section 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. [§] 9605, as amended 
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. 
L. 99–499, (hereinafter CERCLA), and by section 311(d) of the Clean Water Act 
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. [§] 1321(d), as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA), Pub. L. 101–380.  In Executive Order (E.O.) 12777 (56 FR 54757, Octo-
ber 22, 1991), the President delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) the responsibility for the amendment of the NCP.  Amendments to the 
NCP are coordinated with members of the National Response Team (NRT) pri-
or to publication for notice and comment.  This includes coordination with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in order to avoid inconsistent or duplicative requirements in the 
emergency planning responsibilities of those agencies. The NCP is applicable to 
response actions taken pursuant to the authorities under CERCLA and section 
311 of the CWA, as amended. 
Id. 
 186.  Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17. 
 187.  See The Honorable Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of 
Federal Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 615 (2009) (“Large parts of the interstate power 
grid are operated by regional transmission organizations and independent system opera-
tors, some of which also operate centralized power auctions.”). 
 188.  See FERC Order No. 2000, supra note 128, at 190–94 (describing the importance of 
RTO independence from individual utilities that join the RTO and the attendant need for 
the RTO to have the sole authority to file a transmission tariff). 
 189.  See id. at 323–497 (describing the functions of an RTO, including tariff administra-
tion, congestion management, and market monitoring). 
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Although the RTO operates under its own tariff issued by FERC, it has 
a great deal of latitude in choosing the mechanisms for daily grid op-
eration and long-term transmission planning.190 
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”), 
a quasi-public association that writes grid reliability standards,191 also 
intermixes federal, regional, state, and local lines in its institutional 
construction.192  Despite the recent addition of FERC review authori-
ty,193 NERC largely relies on regional sub-institutions (regional enti-
ties) to write and enforce standards for electric reliability, which re-
quire, for example, that utilities follow procedures to prevent 
sabotage of transmission lines and to avoid generation failures that 
could cause voltage swings.194  NERC members—consisting of investor-
owned utilities, municipalities that own and operate utilities, power 
marketers, state public utility commissions, and industrial and indi-
vidual electricity end-users195—all vote on proposed reliability stand-
ards before passing them on to FERC for final approval.196 
A dynamic energy federalism model therefore must recognize 
multiple, simultaneous interactions among numerous players along a 
vertical axis, and, as discussed in Part III, complex relationships 
among these actors: NERC—a regional institution, for example—
                                                        
 190.  See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17 (manuscript at 49–50) (describing the func-
tions of RTOs). 
 191.  About NERC: Company Overview, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc. 
com/page.php?cid=1|7 (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
 192.  See About NERC: Key Players, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com 
/page.php?cid=1|9 (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (describing the entities with which “NERC 
regularly interacts,” including governmental authorities, regional entities, and industry). 
 193.  See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824(o)(b)(1) (2006) (giving FERC the 
authority to regulate reliability). 
 194.  See Standards: Reliability Standards: CIP-002-3 to CIP-009-3, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY 
CORP., http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=2|20 (follow “Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (requiring “Critical Cyber Asset Identification,” 
“Security Management Controls,” Personnel Training,” “Electronic Security Perimeters,” 
“Physical Security of Critical Cyber Assets,” “Systems Security Management,” “Incident Re-
porting and Response Planning,” and “Recovery Plans for Critical Cyber Assets”). 
 195.  Governance: Members, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/page. 
php?cid=1|8|118  (last accessed Nov. 5, 2012) (explaining that NERC membership is “open 
to any person or entity with an interest in the reliable operation of the North American 
bulk power system”). 
 196.  For a more in-depth discussion of these processes, see Osofsky & Wiseman, supra 
note 17 (manuscript at 38–39). 
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proposes reliability standards to FERC in a bottom-up process, and 
FERC ultimately approves them;197 NERC and its subunits also enforce 
many of the standards themselves, with FERC holding review authori-
ty.198  The power within these vertical interactions does not always flow 
first from the top down, and, as also described in more detail in Part 
III, it often involves conflict and cooperation; state members of an 
RTO sometimes support the RTO’s proposals to FERC for transmis-
sion service changes or expanded transmission, for example, and at 
other times oppose them.199  A dynamic energy federalism model cap-
tures these many nuances of vertical institutional relationships. 
2.  Horizontal 
Intergovernmental interactions do not simply occur across dif-
ferent jurisdictional levels.  Often, more than one governmental enti-
ty at a particular level plays an important role in energy decision-
making, which makes the dynamic federalism literature with a hori-
zontal focus salient to energy.  Horizontal federalism issues arise in 
the energy system in numerous contexts and at many levels of govern-
ance.  For example, at the federal level, FERC works with a number of 
other federal agencies in the gas pipeline siting and construction con-
text by coordinating the various approvals that are required for pipe-
lines, such as biological opinions from the Fish and Wildlife Service if 
endangered or threatened species might be affected by construc-
tion.200  To perform this coordinating function, FERC issues a sched-
                                                        
 197.  See 18 C.F.R. § 39.5 (2012) (explaining the process through which reliability 
standard proposals and modifications are submitted, considered, and approved). 
 198.  See 18 C.F.R. § 39.7 (2012) (describing the roles of NERC and its regional entities 
in enforcing reliability standards and reporting violations to FERC). 
 199.  See infra text accompanying note 278. 
 200.  FERC Order No. 687, at 2–3 & n.4 (Final Rule, issued Oct. 19, 2006), 
http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/101906/C-2.pdf.  FERC states that any “rec-
ommendations and opinions . . . necessary for a federal agency . . . to reach a decision on a 
request for a federal authorization that is needed for a proposed [pipeline or LNG pro-
ject] to go forward” will be coordinated by FERC.  Id. at n.4.  If an endangered or threat-
ened species would potentially be jeopardized by the pipeline, it appears that a Fish and 
Wildlife Service biological opinion would be “necessary” and that FERC therefore could 
set a deadline for the completion of this opinion under its new authority.  See id. at 2 & n.4 
(explaining that the Commission has the authority “to establish a schedule for agencies to 
review requests for federal authorizations required for a project” and defining a biological 
opinion required by the Endangered Species Act as a “federal authorization”). 
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ule with deadlines for completion of the various federal authoriza-
tions, requires agency heads to notify FERC of their anticipated deci-
sion dates, and maintains a consolidated record of all authorizations 
required for the pipeline.201 
Many horizontal relationships among key state-level stakeholders 
also take place at a regional level.  While the creation of a regional 
level entity of state actors creates a state-regional vertical dynamic,202 
this Section focuses on the way in which horizontal interactions take 
place within these entities.  For instance, public utility commissions 
frequently interact with each other to compare approaches to obtain-
ing cheaper fuels for electricity generation and ways to implement 
smart grid technologies, including those that allow more grid ac-
commodation of renewables.203  State officials that have to implement 
rules issued by FERC, RTOs, and state public utility commissions also 
have created regional state committees, such as the Organization of 
Midwest Independent System Operator (“MISO”) States (also known 
as the Organization of MISO States, or “OMS”), to coordinate these 
regulating entities’ recommendations and requirements, to influence 
new standards of MISO or FERC, and to provide better regulatory 
oversight of the MISO grid.204 
Similarly, members of the Western Governors’ Association and 
state public utility commissioners within the Western Interconnection 
(the western third of the national grid) joined in a horizontal effort to 
develop “Western Renewable Energy Zones”—areas amenable to the 
construction of large-scale renewable installations.205  After gathering 
state and provincial officials and stakeholders to identify areas with 
                                                        
 201.  Id. at 8, 16, 24–25.  FERC avoids unduly impinging on other federal agencies’ au-
thority by providing that its schedule will comply with those agencies’ federally mandated 
timelines.  Id. at 8. 
 202.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 203.  See, e.g., New England Conference of Public Utilities Comm’rs, 65th Annual 
NECPUC Symposium: Agenda (May 20–22, 2012) available at http://www.necpuc.org/ 
Meetings/NecpucAgenda2012.pdf (including topics such as methods of getting shale gas 
to New England for generation and residential and commercial use and system “regulatory 
adjustments” that may be necessary for this change; “current opportunities and the chal-
lenges in modernizing the grid,” including “access to cheaper, more efficient and clean 
energy technologies”; and addressing grid challenges associated with interconnecting wind 
and variable natural gas resources). 
 204.  OMS Purpose, ORG. OF MISO STATES, http://www.misostates.org/ (last visited Nov. 
3, 2012). 
 205.  W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 109, at 2, 12. 
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open land surfaces, land use laws that would allow for renewable de-
velopment, and abundant renewable resources, the Association is now 
trying to encourage the construction of transmission to these areas.206  
It is “working . . . through the Regional Transmission Expansion Pro-
ject (RTEP) to analyze transmission requirements under a broad 
range of alternative energy futures [and to] develop long-term, inter-
connection-wide transmission expansion plans,”207 which, if successful, 
will harness renewable energy from these ideal construction areas and 
transmit it to load centers.208 
Within states and localities, different types of regional institutions 
allow power plant developers to participate in a centralized process 
that coordinates local and state agency approvals.  In Oregon, for ex-
ample, all large utility developers must apply to the Energy Facility Sit-
ing Council for a siting certificate.209  The state’s Council must exten-
sively consult with other state and local agencies in making the siting 
determination, which involves numerous environmental, social, and 
economic criteria.210  Municipal zoning laws also apply, but the utility 
developer may opt to have the Council determine whether the project 
complies with these laws, thus avoiding time-consuming developer 
negotiations with each individual municipality.211 
Washington State offers a similar process with strong horizontal 
elements, in which the state’s Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council 
is to “serve as an interagency coordinating body for energy-related is-
                                                        
 206.  See id., at 2 (explaining that the Association hopes to “facilitate the development of 
high voltage transmission to those areas with the potential for abundant renewable re-
sources”). 
 207.  Regional Transmission Expansion Planning, W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, http://www.west 
gov.org/initiatives/rtep (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). 
 208.  See W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 109, at 3 (explaining the 
initiative’s intention to “undertake . . . efforts to lay the foundation for promoting the effi-
cient regional development, procurement and delivery of energy from renewable resource 
areas to multiple population centers”). 
 209.  OR. REV. STAT. § 469.350 (2011). 
 210.  ODOE: Energy Facility Siting: The Siting Process for Energy Facilities, OREGON.GOV, 
http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/SITING/process.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2012); see 
also, e.g., Common Power Plant Siting Criteria, PUB. SERV. COMM’N OF WIS., at 3 (Sept. 1999), 
http://psc.wi.gov/thelibrary/publications/electric/electric05.pdf (describing the siting 
criteria used in Wisconsin as considering “Community Impacts,” “Public Health and Safety 
Concerns,” “Environmental Impacts,” and “Land Use Impacts,” among others). 
 211.  ODOE: Energy Facility Siting, supra note 210. 
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sues,”212 including the siting of generation facilities. The Council’s 
first step toward cooperation comes through its membership, which 
includes representatives from the state’s environmental, natural re-
sources, and wildlife agencies; the Department of Commerce; and the 
Utilities and Transportation Commission.213  It also involves these and 
other state agencies in the siting review process.214  Before submitting 
a formal application for certification of a site, a power generator seek-
ing siting approval may apply to the Council for a preliminary site 
study, which the Council conducts in coordination with cities and 
counties where the site is proposed, as well as other state agencies 
“that might be requested to comment upon the potential site.”215  The 
Council also conducts some vertical coordination, as it includes fed-
eral agencies in the site study and environmental review process.216 
Together, these vertical and horizontal relationships reveal ways 
in which federalism dynamics interact with energy law’s tripartite 
structure and the complexities that a dynamic energy federalism 
model captures.  Regulatory structures involve many public and pri-
vate actors functioning at multiple levels of government because they 
must respond to the physical characteristics of sources and the struc-
tures that move them through generation, transmission, and distribu-
tion; those physical interactions involve numerous governing entities, 
such as local or regional utilities that deliver retail electricity, multi-
state transmission line operators, and a federal agency (FERC) that 
oversees interstate flows.217  The market forces further reinforce these 
complex spatial dynamics.  The above-described regulatory frame-
works and institutions have expanded and changed in order to help 
energy supplies meet growing energy demand, while protecting the 
public against potential market distortions—such as utilities resisting 
the expansion of transmission that would increase competition (a 
problem partially addressed by RTOs)218—and externalities, such as 
                                                        
 212.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.040(13) (West 2001). 
 213.  Id. § 80.50.030(3)(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012). 
 214.  See id. § 80.050.030(3)(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012) (providing for the participa-
tion of other “departments, agencies, and commissions . . . at their own discretion”). 
 215.  Siting/Review Process, ENERGY FACILITY SITE EVALUATION COUNCIL, at 8, 
http://www.efsec.wa.gov/cert.shtml#Certification (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  See Spence & Prentice, supra note 175, at 147–49 (describing current regulation of 
electricity by the federal government, regional entities, and the states). 
 218.  See ELEC. ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 5, 30 (2007), 
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the environmental effects of siting generation and its associated 
wires.219 
An understanding of these vertical and horizontal dynamics will 
not by itself, however, create an effective response to this complexity 
or the need for energy transitions.  Rather, these dynamics lay the 
groundwork for the next step in this Article’s dynamic federalism 
analysis: assessing governance challenges and developing a systematic, 
principled response to them.  Part III draws from dynamic federalism 
to explore the relationship between this spatial complexity and effec-
tive governance. 
III.  GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE COMPLEXITY OF 
ENERGY FEDERALISM 
Complex spatial interactions among energy actors along both 
vertical and horizontal axes create difficult governance issues, which 
traditional federalism models that focus on governance levels, rather 
than governance itself, often ignore.  First, do individual key decision-
makers have adequate authority to allow the energy system to func-
tion and evolve in response to modern challenges?220  Second, when 
simultaneous overlap and fragmentation occurs, how should the deci-
sion-making hierarchy be structured (whether along a horizontal or a 
vertical axis) and who makes that decision?221  To what extent do and 
should governance structures encourage cooperation among key ac-
tors, and when does (and should) conflict play a role in driving regu-
lation?222  Third, how should governance systems navigate the diversity 
of public, private, and hybrid actors that play a role in the energy sys-
tem?223  This Part explores each of these questions in turn.224 
                                                        
available at http://energy.gov/oe/downloads/report-congress-competition-wholesale-and-
retail-markets-electric-energy (explaining that “transmission owners may resist building 
transmission facilities if they also own generation and if the proposed upgrades would in-
crease competition in their sheltered markets” and noting that RTOs could help “elimi-
nate any residual discrimination in transmission services”). 
 219.  See Brown & Rossi, supra note 105, at 707–08 (explaining the evolution of central-
ized state siting processes to address environmental concerns, among others). 
 220.  See infra Part III.A. 
 221.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 222.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 223.  See infra Part III.C. 
 224.  Hari Osofsky has explored variations on these governance issues in her federalism 
analysis of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Osofsky, BP Oil Spill, supra note 154, which 
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In its analysis, this Part takes a dynamic federalist approach to 
exploring the relationship between federalism and governance.  Be-
yond its more nuanced spatialization of federalism questions, the dy-
namic federalism literature interweaves broader governance ques-
tions, such as power structures within decision-making processes, with 
traditional federalism concerns.  With respect to the first question of 
individual decision-maker authority, outside of the energy context 
dynamic federalism scholars such as William Buzbee have considered 
the ways in which governance gaps rather than overregulation some-
times result from regulatory complexity;225 these gaps exist through-
out the energy system where key regulators often have inadequate au-
thority to achieve important goals. 
Regarding the second question, the dynamic federalism litera-
ture—again typically without consideration of energy governance 
questions—has analyzed issues of hierarchy and cooperativeness that 
emerge from overlapping jurisdictional authority of actors at multiple 
levels, where no actor has full authority to address a particular exter-
nality.  With respect to hierarchy, scholars such as William Buzbee, 
Ann Carlson, Daniel Esty, and Robert Schapiro have, for example, 
considered how vertical relationships might vary based on context226 
and how they might evolve over time through regulatory interac-
tion.227  The dynamic federalism literature on cooperativeness has 
both provided a range of models for cooperative federalism in which 
states or local entities implement regulations above a federal floor228—
                                                        
builds upon the model of diagonal federalism she introduced in the context of climate 
change, Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism, supra note 119.  We draw upon it here because it ap-
plies particularly well to energy federalism, and none of the federalism analyses in the en-
ergy literature have performed this kind of mapping. 
 225.  Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 157, at 44–48. 
 226.  See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
108, 112 (2005); Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 157, at 23–27; Esty, 
supra note 156, at 609 (1996). 
 227.  SCHAPIRO, supra note 157, at 37–45; Carlson, supra note 157, at 1100. 
 228.  See WILLIAM ANDREEN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, COOPERATIVE 
FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE: WHY FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MUST 
CONTINUE TO PARTNER 5 (2008), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/ 
federalismClimateChange.pdf; Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and 
Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework is Useful for Addressing Glob-
al Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 817 (2008); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal 
for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 791, 797 & n.24 (2008). 
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at times in combination with other theoretical approaches229—and 
explored how uncooperative interactions can form part of a multi-
level regulatory system,230 which sometimes inspires constructive regu-
latory change.  Efforts at energy regulation struggle with all of these 
hierarchy and cooperativeness concerns, as discussed in this Part. 
Finally, regarding the third question of private entities’ participa-
tion in governance, a literature analyzing how public-private dynamics 
interact with regulatory approaches can help to illuminate these rela-
tionships in the energy context.231  The intertwining of public and pri-
vate in energy regulation both poses challenges of institutional design 
and of preventing capture, and provides the basis for innovative strat-
egies for meeting all three of these energy governance challenges. 
                                                        
 229.  Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 861, 888 (2006) (“Properly structured, penalty default rules might be used to in-
duce meaningful participation in locally devolved, place-based, collaborative, public-
private hybrid, new governance institutions, aimed at integrated, adaptive, experimentalist 
management of watersheds and other institutions.”). 
 230.  See Kirk W. Junker, Conventional Wisdom, De-emption and Uncooperative Federalism in 
International Environmental Agreements, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 93, 96 (2004–05); Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1271–80 
(2009); Karen Bridges, Note, Uncooperative Federalism: The Struggle over Subsistence and Sover-
eignty in Alaska Continues, 19 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 131 (1998).  Beyond this lit-
erature directly focused on uncooperativeness, some scholarship includes conflict as one 
strand in its model.  See, e.g., SCHAPIRO, supra note 157, at 100; Carlson, supra note 157, at 
1107.  An extensive literature that addresses cooperation-conflict has arisen in the specific 
context of preemption.  See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 157, at 1576; 
Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 157, at 47; Ann E. Carlson, Federal-
ism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 290–305 (2003); 
Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by 
Federal Enviromental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 
582–83 (2008); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory 
State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 579 (2007); Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Envi-
ronmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 415 (2008). 
 231.  For an example of a broader analysis of public-private, international-domestic reg-
ulatory interactions, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspec-
tive on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 769 
(1998). 
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A.  Inadequacy of Authority 
In part due to the complex federalism map described in Part 
II.B, key regulatory entities often lack authority to move critical ener-
gy governance decisions forward.  This problem is particularly acute 
in the context of transmission.  As discussed above, the federal gov-
ernment has only limited authority to site needed interstate transmis-
sion lines, and has had trouble exercising it.232  Regional organizations 
also have had trouble exercising authority, with the Seventh Circuit 
striking down a regional cost-sharing scheme,233 and this creates un-
certainty for new approaches, such as MISO’s approach to sharing the 
costs of transmission expansion across its territory.234  Through 
MISO’s “multi-value” approach, regions that demand more electricity 
from the new lines pay a larger share of the costs.235  The Organiza-
tion of Midwest Independent System Operator States (“OMS”), how-
ever, does not have full authority to expand the law.  Public utility 
commissions are bound by state law regarding the rates that they can 
approve and allow transmission utilities to pass on to customers—
including that rates be “reasonable and prudent”236 and that the rates 
support projects implemented to respond to public need237—and in-
terstate projects like those proposed by MISO will not always fit within 
                                                        
 232.  See supra notes 137–139 and accompanying text. 
 233.  Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 234.  See MISO Transmission Planning, MIDWEST INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 
https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/About%2
0Us_FAQ/TransmissionPlanningFAQ.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (“Beginning in 2006, 
MISO instituted regional cost sharing for certain transmission upgrades meeting specified 
criteria.”). 
 235.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 110, at 1834–35. 
 236.  See Jim Rossi, Clean Energy and the Price Preemption Ceiling, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & 
ENERGY L. 243, 257 (2012) (“At the state level, regulators apply similar ‘just and reasona-
ble’ rate language under their own statutes in setting retail rates.”). This is similar to 
FERC’s just and reasonable wholesale requirement.  See Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 
U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006) (“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any pub-
lic utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission . . . shall be just and reasonable . . . .”). 
 237.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-18-510 (2012) (“No person shall commence to con-
struct a major utility facility in the state . . . without first having obtained a certificate of . . . 
public need . . . .”). 
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this law.  It is hard, for example, to demonstrate public need in a state 
for a line that simply passes through it.238 
These types of issues run through many other areas of energy law 
and at times involve situations where one regulatory entity ostensibly 
has authority but other regulatory entities make decisions that impair 
implementation of that authority.  For example, in the aftermath of 
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Coast Guard tried to create a sys-
tematic approach to the placement of boom—physical barriers to the 
oil.239  States, however, resisted those decisions and used their own 
regulatory authority and funds given to them from BP to place boom 
in ways that at times thwarted the Coast Guard’s efforts to match bar-
riers to the greatest risks based on tidal currents.240 
Similar blockades emerge in onshore and offshore renewable sit-
ing.  For example, after Texas identified certain regions of the state as 
amenable to wind development and began considering transmission 
that would connect to these areas, at least one county in a windy zone 
passed a resolution opposing wind farms.241  A number of municipali-
ties in states with abundant wind have similarly enacted moratoria on 
renewable development with mixed success.242  In the offshore con-
text, after the Department of Interior (“DOI”) initiated a process to 
approve the Cape Wind project, a host of opponents enlisted a variety 
of state and federal laws in an effort to block DOI’s support.  In a case 
that held up the project for several years, citizens unsuccessfully ar-
gued that Massachusetts’s state authority over certain aspects of fisher-
ies management under the federal Magnuson-Stevens Act should ex-
tend to approval of a wind farm in federal waters.243  Several parties 
                                                        
 238.  See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17. 
 239.  Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 17–20 (Nat’l Comm’n on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Staff Working Paper No. 2, updated 
Jan. 11, 2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Wiseman, supra note 168, at 510 (describing a Gillespie County, Texas resolution). 
 242.  Id. at 510–11 (describing moratoria); see also, e.g., Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy 
Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 279 (2011) (describing a successful Kansas municipal 
ban and an invalidated Wisconsin one). 
 243.  Ten Taxpayer Citizens Grp. v. Cape Wind Assocs., 373 F.3d 183, 197 (1st Cir. 
2004). 
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also invoked the National Historic Preservation Act.244  Although they 
were unsuccessful in blocking the project altogether, DOI ultimately 
consulted with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
(“ACHP”), reduced the number of allowed turbines, and required 
changes to their color to accommodate some of the parties’ con-
cerns.245  While conflict over the existence and extent of authority, as 
well as gaps in authority, in some cases leads to needed deliberations 
and productive consideration of impacts—as shown by the DOI-ACHP 
compromise—it often causes unnecessary and ineffective delay and 
could ultimately halt important projects, such as regional transmis-
sion plans. 
A dynamic energy federalism model, in addition to recognizing 
complex vertical and horizontal interactions, also pinpoints the lack 
of authority that sometimes is disguised by these interactions.  When 
multiple actors have a limited amount of jurisdiction over a particular 
issue, such as RTO control over certain types of transmission planning 
and state and local authority over transmission siting, any one entity 
often fails to cover the holes that remain.  The model proposed here 
requires systematic attention to these problem areas, whether they ex-
ist in oil spill response or transmission siting. 
B.  Simultaneous Legal Overlap and Fragmentation 
In a challenge closely related to inadequate authority in some ar-
eas, two primary types of regulatory overlap and fragmentation take 
place within the tripartite and multi-level energy system.  First, signifi-
cant substantive overlap and fragmentation exists within energy law 
and between energy and environmental law.  For example, when re-
newable energy siting takes place on public land, developers often 
must navigate both state-level and federal-level environmental review 
for different aspects of the project.246  Until siting some transmission 
                                                        
 244.  See Danielle E. Horgan, Note, Reconciling the Past with the Future: The Cape Wind Pro-
ject and the National Historic Preservation Act, 36 VT. L. REV. 409, 410 (2011) (discussing two 
Native American tribes’ threats to file suit against construction of the Cape Wind Project, 
“citing at least fourteen legal shortcomings by the [Minerals Management Service] under 
the National Historic Preservation Act”). 
 245.  Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces Approval of 
Cape Wind Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf off Massachusetts (Apr. 28, 2010), 
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-Approval-of-
Cape-Wind-Energy-Project-on-Outer-Continental-Shelf-off-Massachusetts.cfm. 
 246.  See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 168, at 501, 504–05 (providing examples of complex 
local-state-federal interactions in the siting process). 
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lines through the national-level transmission corridor approach suc-
ceeds, new interstate transmission lines must gain approval through 
state-level public utility commission processes in each state or locality, 
which vary from state to state.247  Similarly, for deepwater drilling pro-
jects, the Coast Guard regulates the platform level, but DOI regulates 
the subplatform level even though activities at the two physical levels 
are interrelated.248  In addition, the subcontracting relationships of 
most major oil companies drilling offshore are governed by the state 
contract law of the nearest state, operating as federal law.249  In some 
cases, jurisdiction overlaps or is simply too complicated to navigate—
potentially causing an anticommons with inadequate levels of energy 
development.250 
Second, even though at times the law tries to foster cooperation 
or coordination among the many entities with partial control over an 
energy issue, structural fragmentation among multiple entities at each 
level of governance makes those arrangements complex.  For exam-
ple, in the context of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the NCP gov-
erning the response included numerous federal agencies in addition 
to state and local government representatives.251  The Department of 
Energy was not included within the group, however, even though it 
was very involved in the spill response, and, at times, key clusters of 
agencies took actions outside the NCP process.  The Environmental 
Protection Agency made the key decisions around dispersants, with 
sign-off from the Coast Guard, and an ad hoc subgroup of the NCP 
team that included the Interagency Solutions group, National Ocean-
ic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Department of Agricul-
ture controlled fisheries closures.252 
                                                        
 247.  Id. at 511–14. 
 248.  CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262, 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 16 (2010), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf. 
 249.  43 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006); see also Fruge v. Parker Drilling Co., 337 F.3d 558, 560 
(5th Cir. 2003) (“Federal jurisdiction is predicated on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act (OSCLA) [and] OCSLA adopts the law of the adjacent state (Louisiana) as surrogate 
federal law, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with other federal laws and regula-
tions.” (citation omitted)). 
 250.  See Wiseman, supra note 168, at 508 (describing underdevelopment of renewable 
energy as a result of multiple layers of authority over the development process). 
 251.  See supra note 185. 
 252.  Decision-Making Within the Unified Command, supra note 239 at 8–9; Osofsky, BP Oil 
Spill, supra note 154, at 1086–87. 
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Similar fragmentation occurs in the power plant siting process, 
particularly for large renewable installations.  In some states, munici-
palities must modify their zoning to accommodate renewable tech-
nologies, and the state must conduct an environmental review or en-
sure compliance with a range of other siting criteria to issue a 
certificate of need.253  The developer also must apply to federal agen-
cies for a myriad of assurances, including, for example, certifications 
that wind turbines will not interfere with aviation or illegally take en-
dangered species.254  The number of approvals required can be decep-
tive; while these processes, combined, may appear comprehensive, 
they can leave gaps due to jurisdictional and substantive fragmenta-
tion.  As Uma Outka has observed, both local and federal processes 
often ignore the cumulative environmental impacts of renewable in-
stallations, even when a review under the National Environmental 
Policy Act occurs.255 
This Section focuses in particular on two governance concerns 
that emerge from these two types of overlap and fragmentation.  Part 
III.B.1 explores the challenges created by competing conceptions of 
how the regulatory hierarchy should be structured.  Part III.B.2 ana-
lyzes the related issue of how cooperative dynamics can and should be 
addressed in the energy governance context. 
1.  Competing Conceptions of Hierarchy 
Like the underlying spatial arrangements of governance (along 
vertical and horizontal axes), the hierarchy of decision-making within 
these arrangements—the entity who decides and the entity who de-
cides who decides256—varies across different areas of energy law.  In 
some instances, a top-down structure dominates.  For example, within 
federal- and regional-utility-based interactions along a vertical axis, 
FERC often issues generalized orders or individual directives that re-
gional transmission organizations must follow, such as tariffs that al-
low RTOs to operate the grid but specify a number of detailed condi-
tions for grid operation, including the assurance of resource 
adequacy (sufficient generation capacity to avoid system interrup-
                                                        
 253.  See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 167, at 502–03 (describing the many layers of ap-
proval required for large wind farms). 
 254.  See, e.g., id. 
 255.  See Outka, supra note 242, at 283 (noting that regulatory structures are “reactive” 
and that this “leads to consistent and pervasive neglect of cumulative impacts”). 
 256.  Erin Ryan, in her work on negotiating federalism, has grappled with the question 
of who decides who decides.  Ryan, supra note 161, at 14–20. 
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tion), conditions for open access for generators, and the factors that 
RTOs may consider in analyzing generator interconnection re-
quests.257  The new EPA rules on greenhouse gas emissions from sta-
tionary sources also at times create specific requirements for states 
and major utilities, which, although generally creating a floor—not a 
ceiling—provide a clear, top-down directive as to the minimum emis-
sions controls that must be achieved.258 
In other instances, bottom-up efforts dominate.  For example, 
states have banded together cooperatively to try to meet shared 
transmission needs and have then proposed that RTOs—and ulti-
mately FERC—approve cost-sharing schemes necessary for transmis-
sion expansion.259  And within NERC (the reliability organization de-
scribed in Part II), any interested member, including an electricity 
end-user, can propose that a regional entity of NERC—or NERC it-
self—write a new reliability standard or modify or terminate one.260 
Finally, dynamic interactions often take place within a mix of top-
down and bottom-up decision-making authority.  For example, a 
comparison of Clean Air Act approaches to mobile versus stationary 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions illuminates two different federal-
ism structures.  Automobile emissions regulation is an area in which 
the Clean Air Act has a particularly strong preemption regime, but 
California and states following it can obtain a waiver of preemption 
and exceed federal standards.261  This structure has resulted in an it-
erative series of conflicting and then ultimately cooperative interac-
tions among the federal government, California and other leader 
states and the automobile industry, which has led to rapid develop-
ment and convergence of greenhouse gas emissions standards under 
                                                        
 257.  See, e.g., FERC Order No. 2003-C, supra note 135. 
 258.  The Tailoring Rule is a floor-based approach, unlike proposed federal cap and 
trade and other national greenhouse gas strategies advocated by certain industry actors, 
which would have created a ceiling.  See Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation, supra note 157, at 
1569–71.  The rule relies on a cooperative federalist regime for implementation, with the 
exception of those states that have opted to have EPA implement the rule. 
 259.  See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 260.  N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., RELIABILITY STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
PROCEDURE 11 (2007).  Although NERC is a private institution, we treat it primarily as a 
public governmental entity, as described in more detail in Part IV.B. 
 261.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006). 
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the Obama administration.262  The Clean Air Act takes a much more 
cooperative federalist approach to stationary sources of greenhouse 
gas emissions (such as power plants) and, as a result, in some aspects 
of its new greenhouse gas regulations applicable to power plants, EPA 
gives the states significant implementation flexibility (which varies 
based on levels of state compliance with minimum standards).  States 
can determine which technologies or other control measures must be 
implemented to achieve federal emissions caps and which sources will 
be subject to the most stringent measures.263  Operating under a fed-
eral emissions control floor, they also can require further reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions.264 
These types of back-and-forth top-down to bottom-up interac-
tions do not just occur within familiar cooperative federalist schemes.  
These dynamics occur in many other contexts as well, as exemplified 
by public utility commissions’ governance of retail rates.  Utilities in 
“nonrestructured states” that retain a natural monopoly within a ser-
vice area must charge one retail rate per kilowatt hour for the electric-
ity that they provide to residential customers.265  This rate is based on 
the cost of the utility’s providing the service to customers,266 including 
the construction of generation and distribution lines, the mainte-
nance of a truck fleet for service and repairs, and the hiring of various 
employees, for example.  The rate also incorporates a reasonable rate 
of return—money in addition to the cost of service—that the utility is 
allowed to make based on calculations of other, similar businesses’ re-
turns.267 
                                                        
 262.  For an in-depth discussion of this evolution, see Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism, supra 
note 119; Freeman, supra note 119; see also Carlson, supra note 157, at 1099–1100. 
 263.  Holly L. Pearson & Kevin Poloncarz, With Legislation Stalled, EPA Presses Forward 
with Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Program Under the Clean Air Act as January 2, 2011 Trigger Date 
Approaches, 587 PLI/REAL 105, 107–11 (2011). 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Industrial users often have separate, uniform rates.  DAVID J. MUCHOW & WILLIAM 
A. MOGEL, ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS 52–54 (1990) (describing different rates for dif-
ferent classes and states’ tendency to shift more of the rate burden to industrial classes). 
 266.  Id.; MICK LONG, TEXAS PUBLIC UTILITY COMM’N, ELECTRIC REGULATION IN TEXAS 
(2009) (packet prepared by Mr. Long for Hannah Wiseman’s “Law of Electricity” class at 
the University of Texas) (on file with author) (showing the line items that went into the 
cost of service calculation for SOAH Docket No. 473-08-3436). 
 267.  MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 265, at 52–54. 
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Within this process, the utility typically can initiate a ratemaking 
proceeding from the bottom up.268  To initiate a rate case, the utility 
files with the state public utility commission and brings boxes full of 
evidence on costs and returns to the commission.269  After the com-
mission confirms that the filing is complete, it often makes initial de-
terminations about facts that do not require administrative review and 
then lists the many remaining factors in dispute.  It then conducts (or 
has an administrative court conduct) a formal ratemaking proceed-
ing,270 in which electricity customers and other affected parties partic-
ipate.271  The parties haggle over the utility’s necessary costs and the 
rate of return—typically paring down the costs that are counted with-
in the rate base and the requested rate of return272—and the public 
utility commission ultimately sets the acceptable rate.273 This top-down 
decision can once again be turned on its head, however, when the 
utility or the public utility commission later requests another rate 
case, thus restarting the entire process. 
Utilities that operate transmission lines or RTOs go through this 
same top-to-bottom, bottom-to-top dynamic with FERC.  The opera-
tor—either an individual utility or the RTO—initially applies to FERC 
for a transmission tariff, which sets in motion a federal ratemaking 
proceeding with calculations similar to those described for state retail 
                                                        
 268.  See Stefan H. Krieger, The Ghost of Regulation Past: Current Applications of the Rule 
Against Retroactive Ratemaking in Public Utility Proceedings, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 993 n.39 
(noting that “usually the utility initiates proceedings to change rates”). 
 269.  See id. at 994–95 (describing the process of approving utility rates). 
 270.  In Texas, for example, in areas that remain regulated, the Public Utility Commis-
sion makes the initial determinations regarding the completeness of the file and the facts 
that do not require consideration and then sends the ratemaking case to the State Office 
of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) for a formal hearing.  Long, supra note 266; see also 
MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 265, at 52–54 (“Generally, the initial [rate] decision is 
made by an administrative law judge who presides at the hearings and issues a recom-
mended decision to the utility commission itself.”).  Florida’s Public Service Commission, 
in contrast, conducts ratemaking hearings itself and makes the final rate determination.  
FLA. PUBLIC SERVICE COMM’N, ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY RATEMAKING IN FLORIDA (2011) 
available at http://www.floridapsc.com/publications/consumer/brochure/Ratemaking. 
pdf. 
 271.  See, e.g., FLA. PUBLIC SERVICE COMM’N, supra note 270 (explaining that affected 
parties may participate in a rate increase proceeding). 
 272.  Long, supra note 266. 
 273.  Kreiger, supra note 268, at 996. 
 2013] DYNAMIC ENERGY FEDERALISM 835 
electricity.274  Once FERC approves a tariff with a rate and conditions 
of service, the individual transmission operator or an RTO often ap-
plies to FERC requesting tariff amendments.275  The amendments ei-
ther are requested due to bottom-up demands (demands for expand-
ed transmission, for example—thus necessitating a higher rate) or 
new, top-down FERC orders that require transmission operators to 
follow new rules, such as providing more assurance of adequate back-
up generation capacity to avoid grid outages.276 
Recognizing that various hierarchical dynamics occur within a 
horizontal or vertical relationship—with top-down and bottom-up ap-
proaches to governance—enables a more nuanced understanding of 
possibilities for structuring energy law institutions.  It allows for con-
sideration of how energy institutions pull in the many entities affected 
by energy decisions and grant these entities different levels of power 
depending on the particular energy issue at hand. 
2.  Cooperation and Conflict 
Energy governance approaches also vary in the extent to which 
they encourage or rely upon cooperativeness.  There are many exam-
ples of cooperative federalism along both the vertical and horizontal 
axes.  For instance, states are trying to work together in the electricity 
context through MISO’s Multi-Value Project (“MVP”), introduced 
above, which will provide expanded transmission to allow more gen-
eration to connect to the grid while also connecting regional benefits 
to costs to ensure fair cost sharing.277  The states governed by MISO, 
through their Organization of MISO States, also cooperate regularly 
                                                        
 274.  See, e.g., Danielle Changala & Paul Foley, The Legal Regime of Widespread Plug-in Hy-
brid Vehicle Adoption: A Vermont Case Study, 32 ENERGY L.J. 99, 113 (2011) (summarizing the 
requirements for Open Access Transmission Tariffs).  The calculations often are far more 
complicated due to FERC rules on cost sharing and the need to ensure that those custom-
ers receiving the benefits of transmission pay for the costs of the transmission service creat-
ing the benefit.  See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FACTS: ORDER NO. 1000 (2011) 
(providing a summary of FERC’s new cost allocation reforms). 
 275.  See, e.g., Amendments, CALIFORNIA ISO, http://www.caiso.com/rules/Pages/ 
Regulatory/Amendments/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) (listing California ISO-
authored tariff amendment filings). 
 276.  See, e.g., infra note 278 and text accompanying note (describing MISO’s filing to 
amend its tariff to comply with new FERC resource adequacy requirements). 
 277.  Press Release, MISO, MISO Board Approves 215 New Transmission Projects (Dec. 
8, 2011), available at https://www.midwestiso.org/AboutUs/MediaCenter/PressReleases/ 
Pages/MISOBoardApproves215NewTransmissionProjects.aspx. 
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to intervene in FERC proceedings—often shifting among positions 
that support a MISO policy or filing, oppose it, or follow a middle 
ground.278 
Focusing on only cooperative federalism, however, would miss 
the many critical uncooperative dynamics that help to structure inter-
actions along both axes and resulting governance approaches.  On 
the vertical axis, for example, lawsuits filed by states opposing FERC’s 
federal imposition of transmission siting authority made FERC restart 
its National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor designation pro-
cess.  For instance, in a case brought by the Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission and environmental groups,279 the Fourth Circuit held 
that even when a state commission denies a transmission siting appli-
cation, FERC does not have federal authority to select an appropriate 
site.280 
As with directional hierarchy, interactions among entities often 
vary in how cooperative and conflicting they are over time.  Ann Carl-
son has explained in the environmental context that these iterative 
interactions can help to foster needed regulation over time.281  These 
types of interactions also occur throughout energy law.  The Delaware 
River Basin Commission (“DRBC”), which governs natural gas well 
development in the Delaware River watershed and is discussed in 
depth in Hybrid Energy Governance, exemplifies these shifting relation-
ships within a regional institution.  The state members and single fed-
eral representative that serve on the DBRC initially cooperated to 
draft a comprehensive set of regulations governing the location of 
well sites, controlling erosion from sites, requiring water testing prior 
to drilling and fracturing, and imposing a number of other con-
                                                        
 278.  See, e.g., Notice of Intervention and Protest of the Organization of MISO States, 
Inc., Docket No. ER11-4081-000, at 1–2 (undated, but in protest of July 20, 2011 filing), 
available at http://www.misostates.org/images/stories/Filings/OMSProtestandComments 
onMISORARER11-4081.pdf (arguing—in opposing MISO’s proposed modification of its 
FERC tariff to address resource adequacy requirements for generation capacity—that the 
action “negatively impacts state jurisdictional responsibilities, lacks clear net benefits, and 
should not be found just and reasonable” and that in following an allegedly “extensive” 
stakeholder process, MISO in fact ignored repeated stakeholder votes against the pro-
posed changes). 
 279.  Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d 304 (4th 
Cir. 2009). 
 280.  Id. at 319–20. 
 281.  Carlson, supra note 157, at 1099–1100. 
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straints on the gas extraction process.282  The process temporarily 
broke down, however, when individual state members began to ques-
tion the adequacy of the process (with New York demanding an envi-
ronmental impact statement under the National Environmental Poli-
cy Act in federal court283) and the substance of the regulations (with 
Delaware’s governor asserting that he would not vote for the regula-
tions, which he viewed as insufficiently protective of the environ-
ment284).  Based on these state concerns, the DRBC has delayed final-
izing its rules and has continued to hold hearings and respond to 
public comments in an attempt to reach a constructive compromise.285 
C.  Inclusion of Private Actors Within “Public” Processes 
In addition to grappling with questions of authority and of over-
lap and fragmentation among key governmental entities, the energy 
system involves a peculiar fusing of public and private interests, which 
results in its governance structures varying in the extent to which they 
are fully public.286  This involvement of private entities in multi-level, 
ostensibly public, processes poses the challenge of establishing ap-
propriate and effective inclusion of private interests without allowing 
inefficient capture of the public processes.  The vertical and horizon-
tal dynamics described in Part II make this task substantially more 
complex. 
Often, the entities that form relationships along both axes are an 
odd combination of private authorities vested with quasi-formal regu-
latory authority and public entities that adopt privately drafted rules.  
RTOs, for example, which impose detailed rules on their private utili-
ty members, are governed by an independent board of managers or 
                                                        
 282.  DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMM’N, REVISED DRAFT NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT 
REGULATIONS (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.nj.gov/drbc/library/documents/ 
naturalgas-REVISEDdraftregs110811.pdf. 
 283.  Complaint at 1-2, New York v. Army Corps of Engineers, CV11-2599 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 284.  Susan Phillips, As Delaware Announces No Vote on DRBC Regulations, Monday’s Meeting 
in Doubt, STATEIMPACT (Nov. 17, 2011), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2011/ 
11/17/as-delaware-sets-to-vote-no-on-drbc-regulations-mondays-meeting-in-doubt/. 
 285.  For an in-depth discussion of the DRBC, see Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 17. 
 286.  See, e.g., STEPHEN BIRD, HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GRP., at Appendix A-RTO 
Governance (2002), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Bird%20ISO 
%20gov%20comparison%20matrix%20App%20A.pdf (comparing ISO governance struc-
tures and each board’s public and private parties). 
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board of directors comprised of both public and private experts.287  
These boards, in turn, respond to an advisory committee typically 
comprised of private generators, transmission owners, power market-
ers, and electricity end users, among others.288  The rules written and 
implemented by this public-private RTO are largely influenced, and 
in some cases must be directly approved by, FERC—both through its 
general orders directed at all RTOs289 and the specific transmission 
tariff that FERC issues to the RTO.290 
NERC has even stronger private elements, as it operated as a self-
governing, industry-led institution for nearly four decades.291  When 
Congress infused more public elements into the process for ensuring 
grid reliability in 2005, it nonetheless left much of the responsibility 
for grid reliability with NERC, which continued to be a private organi-
zation.  Specifically, Congress directed FERC to approve an “electric 
reliability organization” (“ERO”) that would govern grid reliability 
and only gave FERC review authority over it.292  After FERC approved 
NERC as the ERO in 2006, NERC continued writing and enforcing 
standards, which are now mandatory and federally enforceable but 
still private in nature.293 
These issues, however, are not limited to the innovative hybrid 
entities that are the focus of our next article on hybrid energy gov-
                                                        
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  See, e.g., FERC Order No. 888, supra note 127, at 3–6 (mandating functional un-
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ernance; complex public-private dynamics abound throughout the 
fundamental structures of the energy system. State public utility 
commissions and their ratemaking processes retain many private ele-
ments; private utilities powerfully influence the process, for example, 
because they can initiate a ratemaking case.294  While a public utility 
commission can reduce the costs claimed by contesting their validity 
in a formal hearing—as can citizen groups—the utility is a key and in-
fluential player that substantively defines the initial boundaries of the 
regulation, including the rate that ultimately will be set.295 
These dynamics between utilities and their regulators are particu-
larly complex in the context of transmission.  As discussed in Part II, 
although many states no longer consider electricity generation to be a 
natural monopoly, transmission still is largely regarded as one.296  In-
deed, it does not make sense to create redundant transmission archi-
tecture.  But infrastructure investments by the gatekeeper entity can 
lead to unproductive market power that stifles innovation and compe-
tition.297  This market structure around transmission creates a public-
private regulatory dynamic that is unlikely to change any time soon, as 
the government tries to regulate the monopoly to make it act more in 
the public interest than it naturally would. 
These issues also arise in the context of the fuels used in the en-
ergy system.  For example, the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill was ostensibly led by the government, but was highly dependent 
on BP as the legally responsible party.  The National Contingency 
Plan is structured around high levels of involvement by the designat-
ed responsible party, but the public-private dynamics were made even 
more complicated by the interface with the physical realities and 
technological complexity of the spill response.  BP, due to its access to 
the site and initially superior technical knowledge, played a major 
role in shaping available information and steps taken.298 
This combining of public and private within the energy system 
provides both a challenge and an opportunity.  On the one hand, the 
strong interaction of public and private power and preferences can 
                                                        
 294.  See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 295.  See, e.g., The Rate Making Process, RESIDENTIAL UTILITY CONSUMER OFFICE, STATE OF 
ARIZONA, http://www.azruco.gov/rate_making.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012) (explain-
ing the utility’s role in the ratemaking process). 
 296.  Vaheesan, supra note 80, at 110. 
 297.  See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
 298.  For an in-depth discussion of governance issues in the context of the BP Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, see Osofsky, BP Oil Spill, supra note 154. 
 840 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:773 
undermine efforts to achieve needed change, such as when transmis-
sion utilities try to block new connections or retail utilities want high-
er rates from customers.299  The private influence on public decision-
making carries risks of regulatory capture.  On the other hand, these 
intersections create the opportunity for regulatory innovation that 
may help spur needed transformation, and they allow those with the 
technical information necessary for effective regulation to participate 
in the regulatory process. 
Together, these three challenges suggest the need for new ap-
proaches to governance tailored to address them.  These approaches 
need to acknowledge the complexity of the current system, and to be 
able to work with it.  Realistically, the United States is unlikely to 
completely overhaul energy regulation or the overall energy system in 
the coming years.  For energy governance approaches to functionally 
respond to modern challenges, therefore, they must effectively navi-
gate the dynamism of the current system and build upon established 
structures.  The Conclusion that follows provides principles for doing 
so and introduces our next article, which will apply these principles of 
dynamic energy federalism to assess regulatory innovations we de-
scribe as “hybrid energy governance.” 
IV.  CONCLUSION: DYNAMIC FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES FOR MORE 
EFFECTIVE ENERGY GOVERNANCE 
Addressing the challenges outlined in Part III is daunting but 
critical.  The United States is in the midst of a massive energy transi-
tion toward new unconventional domestic fuel development (such as 
deepwater drilling and hydraulic fracturing), an updated grid, and 
greater integration of renewables;300 these shifts demand fresh gov-
ernance strategies.  The emerging energy federalism scholarship pro-
vides important initial suggestions for effective steps forward, but it 
lacks a cohesive vision and dynamism that will be necessary for suc-
cessful energy policy.301 
Having proposed a dynamic federalism model for energy, which 
recognizes the nuanced vertical and horizontal relationships among 
actors and the complexities of energy governance across the many 
subfields of energy laws,302 this Article concludes by proposing three 
                                                        
 299.  See supra Part I.A. 
 300.  See supra Part II. 
 301.  See supra notes 162–170 and accompanying text. 
 302.  See supra Part III. 
 2013] DYNAMIC ENERGY FEDERALISM 841 
core dynamic federalism principles drawn from its analysis in order to 
guide energy governance strategies moving forward.  These principles 
each seek to address one of the governance challenges outlined in 
Part III. Our forthcoming article Hybrid Energy Governance303 then 
builds on this Article’s model through an in-depth analysis of institu-
tions that embody these principles through their hybrid, regional ap-
proaches and that, by using these approaches, support needed energy 
transition.  In particular, Hybrid Energy Governance examines efforts by 
Regional Citizens Advisory Councils and the Delaware River Basin 
Commission to address the risks of oil spills and hydraulic fracturing; 
by NERC to maintain grid reliability in the face of technological 
change; and by Regional Transmission Organizations to create trans-
mission lines and market integration for renewables, particularly 
wind.  That Article complements this one by assessing both the mech-
anisms and the benefits and limitations of operationalizing these 
three dynamic energy federalism principles through hybrid regional 
institutions. 
Principle One: We need institutions or multi-institutional struc-
tures with capacity for multi-level, cross-cutting regulatory authority. 
As described in Part III.A, the inadequacy of authority occurring 
across numerous substantive areas of energy law results from no single 
institution at any particular level of governance having enough au-
thority and from insufficient coordination among the institutions that 
have partial authority.  Addressing this governance challenge there-
fore requires approaches that constitute authority, which, through 
combining key actors and institutions, can comprehensively address 
an energy issue. 
One strategy for creating this authority that is currently being 
employed in multiple areas of energy law is the establishment of what 
we term “hybrid” institutions.  “Hybrid” has been used in many differ-
ent ways in legal scholarship; we define it here as referring to institu-
tions that combine authority from more than one source, whether as 
a formal or informal part of their structure or governance process.  By 
virtue of this combining, these institutions draw from the regulatory 
authority of key stakeholders and foster or force collaborations.  The 
examples we use in Hybrid Energy Governance represent different varia-
tions of this type of institutional hybridity. 
Principle Two: We need institutions that reduce simultaneous 
overlap and fragmentation by creating structures through which hier-
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archy can be defined, cooperation can take place, and conflicts can 
be resolved. 
As described in Part III.B, the simultaneous overlap and frag-
mentation in the energy regulatory system—caused by both substan-
tive and structural divisions—results in challenges regarding how to 
order hierarchy and how to foster productive opportunities for coop-
eration and conflict.  Addressing these governance challenges re-
quires institutions or processes that can bring together substantive 
and structural silos and can create a more efficient and effective ap-
proach. 
While these institutions or processes may have synergies with the 
ones created in response to the first principle, the focus is different.  
Even if institutions within the fragmented system have enough au-
thority, the principle aims to address divided governance structures in 
order to create a more functional overall system. 
As with the first principle, hybridity will be needed here.  Hybrid 
institutions, by including important but separated entities in a shared 
process, can help to resolve some of the complexities.  We focus in 
particular on hybrid entities with significant regional components be-
cause operating on a scale between two governance levels might en-
courage cooperation, or even cooperative conflict, among actors from 
both levels.  For each hybrid entity that we examine in Hybrid Energy 
Governance, smaller-scale actors interact through a regional structure, 
which is also able to interact with larger scale regulatory institutions. 
Principle Three: We need institutions that can integrate key pub-
lic and private stakeholders with structural and procedural protection 
against capture. 
As described in Part III.C, many energy regulatory institutions in-
volve private actors in a variety of ways.  Although integrating gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental stakeholders is a crucial part of ef-
fective energy governance, these institutions need ways of protecting 
themselves against capture by private market participants whose in-
terests may not align with those of the public. 
As with the previous two principles, hybrid structures may be able 
to accomplish these aims more effectively than ones structured 
through one authority at a single level.  The hybrid entities we exam-
ine in Hybrid Energy Governance all include private actors, but with sub-
stantial public oversight and involvement—particularly through ex-
panded stakeholder involvement in decision-making processes.  Our 
examination of these entities in that piece showcases different models 
for private entity inclusion and assesses the extent to which they effec-
tively limit possibilities for capture. 
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The dynamic energy federalism model that we have presented in 
this Article is not a panacea.  It identifies the nuances of federalism 
that should be recognized when analyzing the effectiveness of energy 
institutions and suggesting change, including complex vertical and 
horizontal interactions that occur simultaneously—with local, state, 
regional, and federal actors engaging in novel relationships.  It also 
explores the complicated governance schemes within these interac-
tions, including, in some cases, inadequate authority of various actors 
along either axis, overlapping or fragmented authority, iterative con-
flict and cooperation among these actors, and high levels of private 
entity involvement in governance.304 
In illuminating the complexities of energy federalism and gov-
ernance and suggesting principles that can be systematically applied 
across many energy areas, the model neither eliminates the system’s 
underlying structural challenges nor the massive transitions that it 
faces.  Instead, this Article argues that this type of analysis has value 
because it provides for a holistic, nuanced understanding of how reg-
ulation fits into the energy system, and the federalism and governance 
challenges that result.  This understanding can help to create system-
atic solutions to our governance challenges that can complement cur-
rent discussions of particular components of the energy system.  In 
embracing the complexity of energy and its governance, we must rec-
ognize energy for what it is: the enabler of our daily activities and in-
ternational economy; a multi-stranded system of infrastructure, mar-
kets, and regulation; and the driving force behind unusual 
governance forms.  With this recognition comes greater opportunity 
for a future buttressed by cleaner, fairer, and more efficient energy. 
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